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Pittsburgh Cleaned Up City Hall—Then Power Learned the New Rules — Steel City Stories
HistoryChapter 37 of 4117 min read

Pittsburgh Cleaned Up City Hall—Then Power Learned the New Rules

Steel City Stories

Preparing the first passage.

Steel City Stories · Chapter 37

In 1911 Pittsburgh replaced its Common Council and its Select Council with one council of nine members, elected at large. The change was sold as a cleanup. Fewer officials, a citywide electorate, a ballot that would make responsibility easier to see: those were the reform promises, and they answered a real scandal. The graft prosecutions had shown that a large, ward-heavy, two-house council could hide a price on an ordinance. The new design did not end politics. It moved the advantage toward whoever could campaign across the whole city — money, party organization, newspapers, a name that traveled beyond one ward. Seventy-five years later a federal case recorded what that advantage had meant for Black Pittsburgh. The case is Metropolitan Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. City of Pittsburgh. The courts in that litigation stated two facts this chapter will use and will not loosen: during the at-large era only six Black members were elected to council, and when the suit was filed in 1986 no Black member was sitting.

The structural fact of 1911 is plainer than the later lawsuit and easier to under-specify. A Carnegie Library institutional history, explaining who could sit on the library board after Andrew Carnegie’s deed of trust named the presidents of the old councils, states that the Select and Common Councils were abolished in 1911 and replaced by a single council of nine. The City Archives still hold the old bodies’ minutes into that year: Select Council and Common Council records run through June 1911, and a new council record runs later in 1911. A Pittsburgh City Archives account of the 1911 directory says the General Assembly reorganized the city’s legislative branch in May 1911, creating the nine-member council after the post-annexation combination of Pittsburgh and Allegheny councils had swollen past a workable size. The at-large rule — every voter voting for the whole council, no member tied to a single ward — is the feature the federal courts later described as continuous from 1911 until 1987. This chapter does not need a romantic motive for the number nine. It needs the replacement, the year, and the geography of the ballot. Ward councils gave way to a citywide nine. Power had to learn a new map.

What the reformers thought they were buying

A 1911 civic argument for the “Pittsburgh plan,” printed while the change was still a bill rather than a habit, asked for a council of nine elected at large instead of the dozens then elected from wards, and it bundled that council with the initiative, the referendum, the recall, a nonpartisan ballot, and nomination by petition. The author claimed the endorsement of the city’s civic organizations and of the Chamber of Commerce, and claimed a long season of public meetings. Those are advocacy numbers, useful as a picture of the reform coalition’s confidence, not as an audited attendance sheet. The confidence had a target. After the convictions of common-council leaders in the wood-block conspiracy, and after the grand jury’s presentment on bribery, a smaller council looked like a way to make a bought vote harder to hide. Nine people are easier to watch than a bicameral crowd. A citywide election looks, on a reform poster, like the antidote to a ward heeler.

The antidote had a cost that the poster did not price. A ward councilman can be beaten by the people who live on his streets. An at-large councilman is beaten, if at all, by a coalition that can reach every ward at once. That coalition has historically been a party, a newspaper, a slate, and a treasury. The Third Circuit, describing the system decades later, noted that since 1911 only one Republican had served on council, in the course of explaining why a Black Republican candidate in 1985, Elmer McClung, faced a city whose registered voters were Democrats by about six to one. McClung lost that November, and the court said the election produced an all-white council. The one-Republican observation is the court’s, offered as background, and it is a measure of how completely the new rules settled into one party’s hands. Reform had not abolished organization. It had raised the scale on which organization had to operate, and one organization proved better at the new scale than its rivals.

Citywide rules also changed which neighborhoods could claim a seat as a matter of arithmetic rather than as a favor. A district system gives a geographically concentrated minority a chance to elect a representative even when it cannot elect a citywide slate. An at-large system gives that minority a chance only if it can influence the whole ticket or supply a candidate with citywide appeal. Black Pittsburgh was concentrated. The at-large council was not required to notice the concentration. For decades it mostly did not, which is the fact the 1986 plaintiffs came to court to prove. The reformers of 1911 were not required to have intended that result in order to have built the machine that produced it. This chapter will not invent their private thoughts about race. It will say that a structure adopted to kill ward graft also killed the ward as a unit of representation, and that the second effect outlived the first.

The count the courts were willing to write down

On January 22, 1986, the Metropolitan Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters and nine individuals sued the city, the mayor, the members of council, and the election officials, on behalf of Black residents. The district court certified a class of all Black citizens of Pittsburgh. At the start of the case, Judge Donald Ziegler wrote, an estimated 24 percent of the city’s population was Black, and no Black person was serving on council. The complaint alleged that at-large elections diluted Black voting strength under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982, and under the civil-rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The class wanted an injunction against further at-large elections and an order to adopt election by district.

The history inside that opinion is the verification the six-member claim requires. In 1981 Pittsburgh voters were given a referendum with three choices: keep nine members at large, switch to nine members by district, or create a hybrid of seven district seats and two at-large seats. The district court said the voters chose to keep the at-large system by a margin of 289 votes. It also said that the predominantly Black wards, with one exception, voted to keep at-large elections even though only six Black persons had served on council since 1911. The Third Circuit, in a later opinion in the same case, stated the span cleanly: Pittsburgh maintained at-large elections for its nine-member council from 1911 to 1987, and during that time only six Black members were elected. When the class action began in 1986, the circuit wrote, 24 percent of the population was Black and the council had no Black members. A later popular account from City Cast Pittsburgh repeats the same six-member total for 1911–1987. This chapter uses the total because the federal courts stated it in the litigation that was about that system, not because a blog and a chamber of commerce agree. If the courts had been silent, the number would not be here.

The circuit added a detail that keeps the 1981 referendum from sounding simpler than it was. Both the pure by-district option and the pure at-large option received more yes votes than no votes. At-large was adjudged the winner because it received the largest number of yes votes. Local press, the court noted, called the three-option ballot a “three-headed monster.” The 289-vote margin in the district court’s telling and the confusing double-yes in the circuit’s footnote are the same election described at two levels of frustration. What is stable is the result: at-large survived 1981. What is also stable, in the district court’s account, is that Black wards largely voted to keep it that year, and then, by the time of the May 19, 1987 referendum, a plaintiff affidavit said the Black vote for districts ran 80 to 90 percent. The shift is part of the record. Explaining it is part of the dispute over whether the lawsuit taught the issue or merely arrived while the issue was already moving.

How the rules finally changed

The path from the 1981 defeat to district elections was not a single heroic hearing. In 1982 voters petitioned to put a district referendum on the ballot. Opponents went to the Court of Common Pleas, which held that the proposal changed the form of government and that state law required a government study commission rather than a direct charter amendment. The case is In re Petition for Referendum to Amend the Home Rule Charter of the City of Pittsburgh, 130 Pittsburgh Legal Journal 466 (Allegheny County 1982). The city solicitor, Dante R. Pellegrini, told council in writing that the same constraint bound the council itself. A community group kept pushing. On October 7, 1985, State Representative Thomas Murphy introduced a bill to let Pittsburgh and other home-rule cities change the way they elect council without first electing a study commission. State Senator James Romanelli introduced the companion bill. The Murphy-Romanelli legislation passed in November 1986 and took effect January 1, 1987.

The plaintiffs filed on January 22, 1986, while that bill was still in the legislature. On May 19, 1987, voters amended the home-rule charter to elect council by district. A trial on the merits had been set for June 1. In light of the referendum, the parties settled that day and signed a consent order on June 10, 1987. The order said the defendants admitted no liability. It required an apportionment commission, public hearings, a plan filed with the court, and a fairness hearing under the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The court kept jurisdiction through the next census cycle at the plaintiffs’ urging. After two fairness hearings, Judge Ziegler wrote, the redistricting plan gave Black citizens a proportionate opportunity to elect representatives of their choice, and objections were denied. Nine seats remained. The geography of the ballot did not. Pittsburgh had reformed the 1911 reform without changing the number that 1911 had made famous.

Whether the lawsuit caused the change is a fought question

The consent order did not end the argument about credit. The city said the suit was not the catalyst: the desire for districts predated the complaint, and the real barrier had been the absence of a state statute, which the legislature removed. The plaintiffs said the bill was not certain to pass when they sued, that the referendum was not certain to win, and that the consent order supplied a timetable, hearings, and federal review the statute did not. In the fee litigation, the district court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the suit was the proximate cause of by-district elections. The Third Circuit, in 964 F.2d 244, held that “proximate cause” was the wrong test for prevailing-party fees. The right question, the circuit said, was whether the litigation was a material contributing factor, a looser standard, and it reversed and remanded that part of the fee case. It affirmed the denial of a risk enhancement on the fees. This chapter will not pretend the remand came back with a sentence this record does not contain. What is settled is the chronology and the courts’ disagreement about the legal test. What is not settled, on the opinions used here, is a final factual finding that the lawsuit either did or did not cause the referendum. Defendants admitted no liability. Plaintiffs obtained districts, a court-supervised map, and a fight about fees. Both of those sentences are true, and neither one is a substitute for the other.

Representative Murphy’s role sits in the same unresolved middle. The plaintiffs offered his statement in the fee case as evidence that the litigation mattered to the politics. The circuit discussed the standard and sent the causation question back. A reader can believe, without inventing a holding, that a bill, a referendum, and a lawsuit were all in motion in 1986 and 1987, and that people who wanted credit had a reason to argue. The structural result does not depend on who gets the credit. After May 1987, council members were chosen from districts. The at-large era the circuit dated from 1911 to 1987 was over. The six Black members elected across that era, and the empty chair at the filing of the suit, remained the courts’ description of what the era had produced.

Power learned the new rules, and then the newer ones

The lesson that connects 1911 to 1987 is not that one system was pure. Ward councils had been compatible with the hotel-room conspiracies of 1908. At-large councils were compatible with a three-quarter century in which, by the circuit’s statement, six Black members were elected and, in 1986, none was serving, in a city the court described as about 24 percent Black. District councils are compatible with their own failures: a map can be drawn to crack or pack a neighborhood, a district member can ignore the city, a local machine can be as petty as a citywide one. The federal court that reviewed Pittsburgh’s new plan found a proportionate opportunity, which is a legal conclusion about that plan at that time, not a promise that geography redeems politics. What each reform reliably does is change the skill that is rewarded. In 1911 the rewarded skill became the citywide slate. By the 1980s, a popular account noted, as many as seven or eight of the nine members lived in the East End, and neighborhoods outside that belt asked whether a citywide council was still citywide in anything but the legal sense. That residency claim is the later account’s, not a finding copied from the consent order. It fits the incentive. If the electorate is the whole city and the organization is concentrated, the winners can cluster, and “at large” becomes a phrase rather than a map of where the members sleep.

Black voters’ own 1981 preference for keeping at-large elections, as the district court described the wards, is the fact that blocks a simple story of a community unanimously locked out and unanimously fighting the lock from the beginning. The court put the fact in the opinion and did not hide it. Six Black members since 1911, and still a preference in most Black wards for the system that had produced them so rarely: that combination suggests incumbency, party loyalty, fear of an untested map, or a campaign that had not yet framed at-large voting as a racial injury. By 1987 the plaintiff affidavit described a dramatic swing. The swing is evidence that preferences are historical, not that the 1981 vote erases the six-member record. A group can defend a system and later indict it. The indictment’s strength is the record. The defense’s existence is why the district court bothered to mention the wards.

Nine members, elected one way and then another, turned out to be the durable piece. Pittsburgh did not go back to a forty- or sixty-person bicameral council. It kept the small body the graft reformers had wanted and changed the electorate that chooses each seat. That is power learning the new rules in the precise sense the title means. The 1911 rules rewarded citywide organization and, over time, a narrow pipeline of who could win. The 1987 rules rewarded district organization and created a legal chance for a concentrated Black electorate to elect a candidate of its choice, which is what the fairness hearings were convened to test. Neither rule set abolished the need for money, allies, and a party. They changed where those tools have to be aimed. A councilman under the old ward system could be priced, the previous chapter argued, ordinance by ordinance. A councilman under at-large rules was harder to price in a hotel room and easier to exclude by the cost of a citywide campaign. A councilman under district rules is accountable to a smaller map and exposed to whatever that map’s dominant organization wants. The century does not deliver a clean institution. It delivers a sequence of incentives, each adopted because the last sequence had become intolerable to someone with enough power to rewrite it.

A small council can still miss half a city

The graft reformers were right that a crowd of ward councilmen was hard to watch, and the Wasson defendants had made the point in the worst way. They were not right if they believed that visibility and representation are the same good. Nine members can be famous and still be nine people who live near one another, answer to one party, and campaign on a map so large that a neighborhood cannot replace them by itself. The Third Circuit’s observation that only one Republican had served since 1911 is a measure of partisan closure. The same court’s statement that only six Black members were elected from 1911 to 1987, in a city it described as about 24 percent Black when the 1986 suit was filed, is a measure of racial closure. City Cast’s later note that as many as seven or eight of the nine lived in the East End is a measure of geographic closure, offered as civic explanation rather than as a judicial finding. Together they describe a “citywide” body that had become narrow in party, narrow in race, and, if the residency claim holds, narrow in neighborhood. The 1911 promise was that at-large voting would make the council everybody’s. The record the courts wrote down is that everybody’s council could go decades without a Black member in the room.

The consent order’s machinery is the proof that district elections were not trusted to run on hope. An apportionment commission had to be appointed, hold hearings, take alternate plans, and file a proposal with the federal court. Objectors could be heard. The court held fairness hearings and judged the plan against the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. It retained jurisdiction past the 1990 census. Defendants admitted no liability, which means the city never agreed it had broken the law, even as it submitted the map to a judge. That combination — no admission, and a supervised remedy — is how American voting-rights cases often end, and it is why a careless summary that says “the court found the at-large system illegal” would overread the settlement. The court found, after the hearings, that the new plan gave Black citizens a proportionate opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. The finding is about the remedy that was adopted, not a verdict of liability on the old system. The old system’s factual record, including the six-member count and the empty seat in 1986, is what the opinions recite. Liability was the question the consent order reserved and the referendum partly mooted.

Keeping nine seats while changing how they are filled is the detail that shows continuity of the reformer’s number and discontinuity of the reformer’s ballot. Pittsburgh did not decide in 1987 that the city needed a large bicameral council again. It decided that the small council had to be tied back to places. District lines can be fought, and the court’s retained jurisdiction was an acknowledgment that a map is not self-justifying. They can also do the thing at-large elections structurally resist: let a concentrated community elect a candidate even when that candidate cannot carry a citywide slate. The plaintiffs asked for that chance. The May 19, 1987 referendum granted the chance as a matter of charter law. The consent order tried to make the chance real under federal voting-rights standards. Power did not leave the building. It learned that a district, a hearing, and a census could be the new conditions of a seat, just as a citywide slate had been the condition after 1911, and just as a ward organization had been the condition before that. Each rule set was a cleanup to someone. Each one aged into a system whose exclusions had to be documented by someone else.

The documentation, when it finally arrived in a form a court would repeat, was numerical and narrow, which is why it can be used. Six Black members elected from 1911 to 1987. None serving when the Crusade for Voters filed on January 22, 1986. About 24 percent of the city Black at that filing. A 1981 referendum that kept at-large voting, including in most predominantly Black wards, by the district court’s account, and a 1987 referendum that ended it. A consent order that disclaimed liability and still put the new map under a federal fairness hearing. A circuit court that refused to treat “proximate cause” as the test for whether the plaintiffs had prevailed on fees, and that sent the question back. Those are the pieces. They do not require a villain in 1911 who planned a white council, and they do not require a saint in 1987 who fixed representation for good. They require a reader to see that a reform adopted after graft convictions rearranged where power pooled, that the new pool was visible in who could win a citywide seat, and that the city eventually changed the pool’s rules again when the exclusion was plain enough to sue over and to put on a ballot. The nine-member council survived both rearrangements. The claim that it was a neutral instrument did not.

What remains disputed

The six-member figure is a statement by the federal courts in this case, including the Third Circuit’s formulation that only six Black members were elected from 1911 to 1987, and the district court’s statement that only six Black persons had served since 1911 by the time of the 1981 referendum. This chapter does not independently re-count every council roster. If a later historian finds a name the courts omitted, the courts’ sentence would need a correction; it is not corrected here. The 1981 margin of 289 votes and the three-option “yes” confusion are both in the opinions and describe one messy election. Whether Black wards’ 1987 support for districts was 80 to 90 percent rests on a plaintiff affidavit the circuit quoted. Whether the lawsuit was a material cause of the change was remanded, not finally resolved in the opinions relied on here. The claim that seven or eight members lived in the East End, and that no Republican had been elected since the 1930s, comes from a later civic explainer and sits beside, rather than inside, the court record; the court itself said only one Republican had served since 1911. The May 1911 dating of the state reorganization is a city-archives narrative. The abolition of the two councils and the creation of a nine-member body in 1911 is the institutional fact. Motives of the 1911 reformers beyond their public anti-graft and anti-ward arguments are not in the documents as private confessions, and they are not invented here.

Evidence Ledger

  • Metropolitan Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. City of Pittsburgh, 727 F. Supp. 969 (W.D. Pa. 1989), for the 1986 filing, the 24 percent figure, the absence of a Black member, the 1981 referendum, the six-member statement, and the 1987 consent order: law.justia.com, 727 F. Supp. 969.
  • Metropolitan Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. City of Pittsburgh, 964 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1992), for the 1911–1987 at-large span, the six Black members elected, and the fee-standard remand: 964 F.2d 244.
  • Metropolitan Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. City of Pittsburgh, 686 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. Pa. 1988), for the class allegations and the claim against at-large elections: law.justia.com, 686 F. Supp. 97.
  • Carnegie Library institutional history, for the 1911 abolition of Select and Common Councils and the nine-member replacement: Carnegie Library history.
  • Pittsburgh City Archives, 1911 municipal record, for the overlapping minutes of the old councils and the new body: pittsburgharchives.access.preservica.com.

This chapter is an original public expansion of PittsburghEverything’s Steel City Stories. It does not replace a Google Drive FULL MASTER.

Archival photographs relevant to this chapter. Sourced from Wikimedia Commons with attribution — not modern stock art.

City Hall and Smithfield Street, Pittsburgh, Pa (NYPL b12647398-66550)

City Hall and Smithfield Street, Pittsburgh, Pa (NYPL b12647398-66550)

Wikimedia Commons · City Hall and Smithfield Street, Pittsburgh, Pa (NYPL b12647398-66550).tiff · Detroit Publishing Company · Public domain

Pittsburgh City-County Building

Pittsburgh City-County Building

Wikimedia Commons · Pittsburgh City-County Building.jpg · PittsburghMayorsOffice · CC BY-SA 4.0

MELLON SQUARE IN DOWNTOWN PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA. IT WAS REFURBISHED DURING URBAN RENEWAL IN THE RENAISSANCE PROGRAM OF THE EARLY 1950'S AND HAS CREATED A PARK-LIKE ATMOSPHERE IN THE CITY

MELLON SQUARE IN DOWNTOWN PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA. IT WAS REFURBISHED DURING URBAN RENEWAL IN THE RENAISSANCE PROGRAM OF THE EARLY 1950'S AND HAS CREATED A PARK-LIKE ATMOSPHERE IN THE CITY

Wikimedia Commons · MELLON SQUARE IN DOWNTOWN PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA. IT WAS REFURBISHED DURING URBAN RENEWAL IN THE RENAISSANCE... - NARA - 557256.jpg · John L. Alexandrowicz · Public domain

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