The Price of a Pittsburgh Councilman
Preparing the first passage.
Steel City Stories · Chapter 36
Pittsburgh’s early-twentieth-century graft story is usually told as a personality. The court record tells it as a set of ordinances with a price. Between the magazine indictment of a political machine and the jury verdicts against named councilmen there is a gap, and the gap is where this chapter has to live. Lincoln Steffens could describe a system. A grand jury could name transactions. A trial jury could convict three councilmen of conspiracy and acquit a fourth. Those are different kinds of truth. Mixing them is how a rumor acquires the dignity of a sentence, and how a real sentence gets lost in folklore about bosses who were never the defendants in the case.
The adjudicated core, for this chapter, is Commonwealth v. Wasson, decided by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on March 3, 1910. The defendants on the indictment were John F. Klein, William Brand, J. C. Wasson, and W. W. Ramsey. The first three were convicted. Ramsey was acquitted. At the time of the alleged conspiracy, Klein, Brand, and Wasson were members of common council. Brand was president of that body and therefore an ex officio member of its committees. Wasson was chairman of the finance committee. The first count charged a conspiracy to cheat and defraud the city of its money and property and to do other dishonest acts to the city’s prejudice. The second count charged a conspiracy involving bribery of the defendants and other councilmen in connection with paving streets with wood block. The court affirmed the legal framework of the convictions against the arguments raised on appeal. That is the outcome. Everything colorful around it has to be labeled before it is used.
What the jury was allowed to believe
The Superior Court’s opinion, written by President Judge Rice, is valuable because it refuses to skip the mechanics. Robert Wilson was a detective employed by the Voters’ League, a voluntary organization whose stated purposes included honest and efficient city administration and the investigation of how ordinances actually passed. Wilson brought in Herbert W. Jones and T. S. Huffling. Their method, as the court recounted it from the commonwealth’s testimony, was a false commercial story. Jones presented himself as a claim agent for a U.S. Lumber Company that wanted Pittsburgh streets designated for wood-block paving. Wilson presented himself as “Mr. Dolph,” a retired director of that company. Neither man was authorized to represent the company, and the company had no intention of furnishing wood block to the city. Between November 7 and December 14, 1908, the court said, the detectives held a series of interviews with Klein, Brand, and, later, Wasson, in adjoining hotel rooms at the Duquesne and then the Fort Pitt, with gimlet holes in the doors so that listeners in the next room could see and hear.
If the jury believed the commonwealth’s witnesses, the opinion says, it could find an agreement with several parts. One was to procure, by bribery of councilmen, a resolution designating part of Fourth Avenue for wood-block paving, with $3,000 to be distributed for votes and influence. Another was to keep passing paving ordinances, to build a fund equal to fifteen percent of the value of each wood-paving contract for distribution to councilmen, and to put up $500 in campaign expenses for each candidate who would “go along” in the future. A third, incident to the scheme, was to form a corporation to lay the paving, controlled by Klein, Brand, and other councilmen whose names would not appear on the books. The court was careful about Wasson, who joined the conversations later. Wilson’s testimony, as summarized, had Wasson discussing the $3,000, the fifteen percent, and the campaign money, suggesting that $200 be put up at the primaries and the rest at the election, and taking three $100 bills. The opinion says that if the jury believed it, this was participation in a live conspiracy, not mere knowledge of someone else’s plan. The jury convicted him. The appellate court held the evidence legally sufficient.
The bank ordinances sit underneath the wood-block case as the thing the detectives had been hired to investigate, not as a second verdict automatically proved by the first. The Voters’ League wanted evidence about ordinances designating six banks as city depositories, “of which there had been rumors,” in the court’s phrase. During the hotel conversations, the commonwealth’s testimony had the defendants describing the bank deal as a pooled distribution of money after the ordinance passed. The trial judge allowed that testimony because the alleged wood-block conspiracy contemplated using the same method, and admissions about the method were relevant. That is not the same thing as a separate published judgment, in this opinion, convicting a list of bankers. The opinion treats the bank transaction as the pattern the paving conspiracy was supposed to copy, proved here through what these defendants said and did in the hotel rooms. A reader who wants the names of every depositor and every dollar has to go to the indictments and the trials that were actually about the banks. This opinion will not be stretched to do that work.
The detective problem, decided and still ugly
The defense that makes the case morally noisy is the one the court spent pages rejecting. The particular conspiracy, Rice wrote, would not have been formed without the detectives’ fake desire for wood-block streets and their pretense that bribes would be paid. No one deceived the councilmen about whether their own part was criminal. The court said the gist of conspiracy in Pennsylvania is the unlawful agreement, and that an overt act is not required to complete the crime. It followed that three councilmen could be guilty of agreeing to pass ordinances for bribes even if the outsiders secretly intended not to pay and to frustrate the scheme. On the public-policy argument — that courts should not countenance ugly detective methods — the opinion drew a line between a trap set for a private corrupt purpose and artifice used to catch people suspected of crimes that affect the public. It placed this case in the second class and held that the trial court did not err in refusing to direct an acquittal. It also held that the jury, not the appellate court, decided whether the detectives were accomplices whose testimony had to be especially distrusted, and that the charge on that point fit Pennsylvania law.
Affirming the convictions is not the same as admiring the method. Gimlet holes, false names, and a lumber company that did not exist are a nasty way to make a record, and the opinion acknowledges how much controversy detective traps had produced in other courts. The legal point the Superior Court settled is narrower. These defendants could not escape a conspiracy verdict on the ground that the men offering the money were league detectives rather than paving contractors. Ramsey’s acquittal sits in the same case as a reminder that the jury did not swallow every name on the indictment. Four men were tried on this bill. Three were convicted. One was not. That split is part of the adjudicated record, and it is an embarrassment to any telling in which “the council” as a blob was found guilty.
What the newspapers added, and what they could not finish
A press report datelined Pittsburgh, March 30, 1910, and printed in an Oregon newspaper, says that John F. Klein went to the Western Penitentiary that day to begin a sentence of three and a half years, and that his confessions had driven the recent developments in the scandal. The same report says Dr. E. R. Waters of select council was indicted as the alleged recipient of $1,000, that fifteen other councilmen were named as having received amounts from $250 to $500, and that the indictments totaled 91 in two weeks, with District Attorney Blakeley promising more. It describes a hunt for “men higher up,” and a search for $45,000 supposedly sent to New York to be passed to Charles Stewart, whose confession the report credits with the distribution of $12,000 to buy votes for a bank ordinance. These sentences are journalism about charges and about a confession. They are not, in this chapter’s hands, a stack of additional convictions. An indictment is a grand jury’s accusation. A confession reported in a newspaper is a lead that may have been tested in court and may have been the basis of a plea, but the Oregon printing is not the judgment docket. Klein’s imprisonment is reported as a fact of that day, consistent with his conviction in the Wasson case, and the length of the term is the newspaper’s figure. Waters and the fifteen are, in that article, indicted or named. This chapter will not promote them to convicted status on a wire story.
Commonwealth v. Bolger, another Superior Court opinion from the same season, describes the institutional engine behind those indictments. In 1909 a grand jury began a general inquiry into bribery of members of Pittsburgh’s city councils. At the end of its sitting it made a lengthy presentment reciting a number of separate transactions. Bolger himself appears in that opinion as a witness before the grand jury, and the legal question on appeal was about the use and consequences of that testimony, not about whether the presentment had imagined the subject. The presentment is the document that turns rumor into a list of transactions a grand jury was willing to describe. It is still not a judgment of sentence against each person named. The discipline is tedious and necessary. Grand jury, indictment, conviction, acquittal, and press report are five different shelves. Steffens belongs on a sixth.
The magazine city and the convicted councilmen
Years before Klein sat in a hotel room with a detective calling himself Dolph, Lincoln Steffens published “Pittsburg: A City Ashamed,” a magazine investigation that is still the most widely read portrait of the city’s political system. Steffens argued that corruption in Pittsburgh was not a story about a foreign underclass but a deliberate organization that began with railroads buying the government and matured under Christopher L. Magee, whom he called the boss, with William Flinn as the contractor-politician paired with him in the public mind. Steffens was explicit that Magee was already dead, and he was explicit that he was describing a system of franchises, contracts, and a managed council rather than reading from a verdict. The essay’s power is the power of reported observation and of a theory: that misgovernment had been made businesslike. Its limit is that it is not Commonwealth v. Wasson. Magee does not appear as a defendant in the 1910 paving case, because he was dead before the hotel rooms were rented. Flinn does not appear as one of the four men the Wasson jury judged. To write that the courts convicted the Magee-Flinn machine is to launder a magazine essay into a judgment the reporters of 1910 were still calling unfinished when they wrote about “men higher up.”
The honest connection runs the other direction. Steffens described a council that could be organized around private prices for public acts. The Voters’ League, a decade later, hired detectives because rumors about bank-depository ordinances fit that description. The grand jury of 1909 presented bribery of councilmen as a subject with multiple transactions. A trial jury in the wood-block conspiracy convicted the president of common council, the chairman of finance, and another member, and acquitted Ramsey. A newspaper then reported a wave of indictments and Klein’s departure for the penitentiary. That sequence is how a systemic accusation becomes a set of proved agreements. It does not convert every story Steffens heard into a count in an indictment, and it does not convert every indictment into a cell. The price of a councilman, in the only place this chapter will use the phrase as a fact, is the price the Wasson evidence put on specific acts: $3,000 for a Fourth Avenue resolution, fifteen percent of paving contracts, $500 toward the election of a cooperative member, $300 in bills handed to the finance chairman in a hotel room. Those figures are what the appellate court said the commonwealth’s testimony supported and what the convictions left standing. They are not a price list for the entire Gilded Age council.
Why the structure was the next argument
The convictions did a kind of political work that an exposé alone had not done. A magazine can be dismissed as an outsider’s insult. A jury verdict against the president of common council and the finance chairman is harder to file under style. Reformers who wanted to abolish the large bicameral councils — a Common Council and a Select Council, ward-based, numerous enough that responsibility could be scattered — could point to a proved conspiracy inside those bodies rather than only to a boss who had died. The next chapter is about the 1911 replacement of those councils with nine members elected at large. This chapter’s contribution to that story is the evidentiary predicate, kept in its lane. Enough was proved, about named members and a described method of buying ordinances, to destroy the claim that the old structure was only suffering from gossip. Not enough was proved, in the sources used here, to convict the famous names that folklore still prefers, or to turn a detective’s lumber-company fiction into a completed theft of a paving contract that the city actually let. The crime was the agreement. The court said the agreement was enough.
There is a final caution about the city’s name in the old pleadings. The opinions say Pittsburg, without the final h, because that was the official spelling in those years. The council was the city’s council either way. The money the conspiracy contemplated was city money and city legislation either way. What changed after the verdicts was not the spelling. It was the plausibility of leaving dozens of ward councilmen in charge of depositories, paving, and franchises without a structural answer. Whether the structural answer worked is not a question Wasson can settle. Wasson settles that the price was real, that three men were found to have conspired to charge it, that one man tried with them was not, and that the method used to catch them was legally tolerated and morally easy to dislike.
A price list is not a legend
The figures that survive appellate scrutiny are specific enough to resist folklore and too specific to be generalized into every contract the city ever let. Three thousand dollars for a Fourth Avenue wood-block resolution. Fifteen percent of the value of future wood-paving contracts, to be distributed for votes and influence. Five hundred dollars toward the nomination and election of each councilman who would go along. Three hundred dollars in bills, in Wilson’s testimony, handed to the finance chairman after he had talked through the scheme. A pooled distribution, described in the same testimony, as the method of the earlier bank-depository ordinance. These are the commonwealth’s numbers as President Judge Rice organized them, and they are the numbers a jury was permitted to believe when it convicted Klein, Brand, and Wasson. They are not Steffens’s citywide estimate of a machine, and they are not the newspaper’s ninety-one indictments. A reader who wants “the price of a Pittsburgh councilman” as a single tariff will be disappointed on purpose. The price in this case was a menu of payments for a menu of official acts, aimed at paving and patterned, in the testimony, on depositories. Other acts had other prices, if they had prices, and those other prices live or die with their own dockets.
The Voters’ League is the institutional link between rumor and the hotel rooms. The court describes it as a voluntary body devoted to businesslike, honest administration, to investigating how the city was actually run, and to encouraging faithful officials. It employed Wilson to investigate ordinances suspected of having been passed by bribery, particularly the six-bank depository ordinances. The detectives then built a fictional lumber deal to see whether councilmen would sell a future ordinance the same way. That choice of method is why the case feels like entrapment to anyone who stops at the fake company, and why the court treated it as detection of an existing practice rather than as the invention of a crime the defendants would not otherwise have contemplated. The opinion concedes the conspiracy as charged would not have been formed without the detectives’ approach. It holds that the criminal agreement was still theirs, because they agreed to sell official acts. Both halves have to stay in the chapter. The league did not stumble onto a signed receipt in a drawer. It constructed a test. The councilmen who failed the test were not, in the court’s holding, innocent bystanders of the test’s design.
Ramsey’s acquittal is the control. He was on the indictment with the president of common council, the finance chairman, and Klein. The jury convicted the other three and let him go. Whatever the testimony suggested about who would handle money in the future, it did not, for that jury, prove Ramsey’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A scandal narrative that cannot pause for an acquittal is not using the record. It is using the record as a mood. The same pause applies to the newspaper’s “men higher up.” On March 30, 1910, a wire story could say the grand jury was still seeking the big names, that Klein had gone to the penitentiary, and that more indictments were coming. Seeking is not finding. Coming is not convicting. Dr. E. R. Waters and the fifteen other councilmen appear in that story as indicted or named. Their cases, if they were tried, are not the Wasson opinion. Charles Stewart appears as a confessed distributor of bank-ordinance money. His confession is the paper’s attribution. It may have been powerful evidence in a courtroom. It is not, in this chapter, a license to list every recipient as a sentenced felon.
What the old councils made possible
Brand’s presidency and Wasson’s finance chairmanship are what make the convictions structural rather than merely personal. The people convicted were not back-benchers the machine could disown as clerks. They were, on the court’s statement, the presiding officer of common council and the chair of the committee that handled money. A conspiracy that includes those offices is evidence about the institution, even though the institution as a whole was not a defendant and even though Ramsey’s acquittal warns against collective guilt. Bicameral councils elected from wards created many doors: a resolution in one branch, a committee in another, a depository ordinance that could be pooled and paid out a month later, in the method the testimony described. Steffens had argued, years earlier and without these verdicts, that Pittsburgh’s misgovernment was organized rather than occasional. The 1908 hotel rooms and the 1910 affirmance are the later, narrower proof that organization of a criminal kind reached the officers responsible for legislation and finance. They are not proof of every story he printed about railroads, franchises, and the dead boss.
The reform that followed, a nine-member council elected at large, was a bet that fewer doors would mean fewer prices. That bet is the next chapter. This one ends on the evidence that the doors had prices, that a jury put three councilmen behind that conclusion and declined to put a fourth there, and that a grand jury in 1909 had already told the public the subject was bribery across multiple transactions. The city could still choose to believe the magazine, the presentment, or the verdicts, and serious people used all three. Only the verdicts are adjudicated outcomes. The rest is investigation, accusation, and, where the chapter has said so, rumor kept in its place.
Keeping the shelves separate is what makes the price believable. If every story about Christopher L. Magee is treated as a count of conviction, the actual convictions against Brand, Wasson, and Klein look like footnotes to a legend, and a dead man is tried in his absence. If every indictment in the March 1910 newspaper is treated as a sentence, the Wasson jury’s decision to acquit Ramsey becomes an inconvenience. If the detectives’ fiction is treated as the crime itself, the agreement to sell ordinances disappears, which is the opposite of what the Superior Court held. The chapter’s method is the duller one. Steffens may be read as a contemporary investigation of a system. The 1909 grand jury may be read as a presentment that bribery of councilmen was a subject of multiple transactions. The Wasson opinion may be read as an affirmance that three named members of common council were properly convicted of a conspiracy aimed at wood-block legislation, and that a fourth was acquitted. The newspaper may be read as a report that Klein entered the penitentiary and that more charges were being laid. None of those readings needs a private confession this record does not contain, and none of them needs a rumor promoted one shelf higher than the document that carries it.
The title’s price, then, is a documented bargain inside one conspiracy, not a citywide rate card. Councilmen agreed, on the evidence the jury was allowed to accept, to trade official acts for money the detectives pretended a lumber company would pay, using amounts the Superior Court put in its statement of the case. A grand jury the year before had already described bribery of council members as a field of separate transactions. A newspaper the month after the appellate decision reported Klein in the penitentiary and a stack of fresh indictments. Steffens had described the machine that made such bargains imaginable, and he had not convicted anyone. Held apart, the sources show a city that proved some of what it suspected and kept suspecting more than it proved. That is the scandal at the size the record will bear. The record is large enough to name the convicted councilmen and too careful to convict the legend that grew up around them. Klein, Brand, and Wasson were convicted. Ramsey was acquitted. The famous bosses were not the defendants in that verdict, and this chapter will not pretend they were.
What remains disputed
The Superior Court decided legal sufficiency and the detective defense. It did not retry the credibility of every hotel conversation, which remained the jury’s. Klein’s three-and-a-half-year term and the day he entered the Western Penitentiary come from a contemporary press report, not from the pages of the Wasson opinion quoted here. The indictment counts, the $1,000 and $250-to-$500 figures, the $45,000, and the $12,000 attributed to Stewart are that newspaper’s account of grand-jury activity and should not be read as sentences. Which of the ninety-one reported indictments ended in conviction, plea, or dismissal is outside this chapter’s docket. Steffens’s portrait of Magee and Flinn remains a classic investigation and not a judgment. How much of the bank-depository ordinance was criminal in the same way the wood-block agreement was criminal depends on the trials specifically about those banks, which this chapter does not substitute with the paving opinion. The phrase “men higher up” is the press’s expression of an unfinished hunt. It is not a finding that the hunt succeeded.
Evidence Ledger
- Commonwealth v. Wasson, 42 Pa. Super. 38 (1910), for the convictions of Klein, Brand, and Wasson, Ramsey’s acquittal, the wood-block conspiracy evidence, and the ruling on detective methods: Superior Court opinion in Wasson.
- Commonwealth v. Bolger, 42 Pa. Super. 115 (1910), for the 1909 grand jury’s general inquiry and presentment on council bribery: openjurist.org, Bolger.
- Lincoln Steffens, “Pittsburg: A City Ashamed,” for the magazine account of the Magee-Flinn system, kept separate from the verdicts: Steffens essay text.
- Contemporary press report, March 30, 1910, on Klein’s reported sentence and further indictments, used only as press and not as a judgment docket: Historic Oregon Newspapers, March 31, 1910.
This chapter is an original public expansion of PittsburghEverything’s Steel City Stories. It does not replace a Google Drive FULL MASTER.
Historic Pittsburgh · Chapter 36
Archival photographs relevant to this chapter. Sourced from Wikimedia Commons with attribution — not modern stock art.

Bobby-Wilson-politician
Wikimedia Commons · Bobby-Wilson-politician.jpg · Popscreenshot · CC BY-SA 4.0

Pittsburgh City-County Building
Wikimedia Commons · Pittsburgh City-County Building.jpg · PittsburghMayorsOffice · CC BY-SA 4.0

City Hall and Smithfield Street, Pittsburgh, Pa (NYPL b12647398-66550)
Wikimedia Commons · City Hall and Smithfield Street, Pittsburgh, Pa (NYPL b12647398-66550).tiff · Detroit Publishing Company · Public domain
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