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The Mall That Pittsburgh Built to Save East Liberty—and Nearly Killed It — Steel City Stories
HistoryChapter 33 of 4117 min read

The Mall That Pittsburgh Built to Save East Liberty—and Nearly Killed It

Steel City Stories

Preparing the first passage.

Steel City Stories · Chapter 33

East Liberty’s postwar planners were trying to save a shopping district. That purpose is in the later institutional histories, and it has to stay in the first sentence, because the damage that followed is so obvious that intent gets rewritten as sabotage. The record does not show a conspiracy to kill the neighborhood. It shows a large public project, aimed at suburban competition, that replaced a street grid with a ring road and a pedestrian mall, and a commercial count that then fell. Decades afterward the same public machinery began undoing the ring. The undoing is evidence about effects. It is not a confession that the original authors hoped for failure.

An East Liberty Development, Inc. history states the goal in plain language. The redevelopment was designed to position East Liberty to compete with shopping malls in outlying suburbs, which by the 1960s were attracting shoppers and shop owners away from the district. The plan called for bulldozing neighborhood streets, displacing residents, and creating a pedestrian mall. The busiest streets — Penn Avenue, Highland Avenue, and Broad Street — were closed to traffic. The history describes a 500-acre, $68 million project that eliminated roads formerly lined with single-family houses. Narrow streets were replaced by Penn Circle, a four-lane, one-way ring road dotted with vast parking lots. The sentence that follows in that history is the one this chapter adopts as its standard of intent: the project was intended for good, and the new traffic patterns inadvertently drove shoppers away.

What the mall was competing with

A pedestrian mall in 1960s planning was not a whim. Suburban shopping centers had solved, for a car-owning customer, a set of problems older commercial streets were accused of failing: parking, a single destination, climate, and a landlord who could curate tenants. East Liberty was one of the city’s strongest commercial districts, which is why it was worth this much public effort rather than being ignored. The ELDI history’s retail counts, offered as the boom and the fall, put a peak of 575 businesses in 1959, 292 shops in 1970, and 98 by 1977. It places the closing of Mansmann’s department store, after nine decades, in the following year. If those counts hold, the district lost roughly half its shops in the decade that included the reconstruction, and then lost most of what remained by the late 1970s. The history does not, in the passage used here, print the survey method behind 575, 292, and 98. They are the organization’s figures, and they are the best business series this chapter has. They are not a city controller’s audit. They are also not the sort of numbers a neighborhood group invents when it wants to pretend nothing was wrong before the bulldozers. A peak in 1959 is an admission that the district was already a real retail center, which is the premise of a rescue.

The rescue’s physical idea was to make the old center behave more like the rival. Close the core to cars so that walking could imitate a mall concourse. Wrap the core in a fast one-way road so that drivers could arrive and park. Clear houses and small streets that interrupted the new geometry. Build parking lots where the grid had been. Add a large amount of publicly supported housing, which the ELDI history puts at more than 2,000 rental units in townhouse clusters and apartment buildings, most visibly three 20-story towers. The history says those towers damaged a long local tradition of home ownership and that families began moving away. A BikePGH essay, arguing from the other direction, dates the Penn Avenue pedestrian mall to 1969 and its removal to 1986, and describes the broader project as tearing down hundreds of buildings, hollowing the neighborhood for the ring road and surface lots, and replacing 1,200 homes with high-rises that could not house 1,200 families. The 1,200 and the “more than 2,000” are not the same statistic. One is a count of homes removed, in a cycling organization’s essay. The other is a count of rental units built, in the community-development history. Both can be true if demolition and new construction are different piles. They cannot be used as if they were one number. This chapter keeps them apart.

A ring is not a sidewalk

Penn Circle is the part of the project that later officials have been most willing to call a mistake, and their language has to be timed. In August 2022 the Urban Redevelopment Authority issued a notice to proceed on a $7.2 million conversion of Station Street and Euclid Avenue from one-way to two-way traffic, with construction expected from September 2022 through December 2023. The authority called it the final phase of converting Penn Circle, “the urban renewal-era roadway constructed in the 1960s.” Executive director Greg Flisram described the conversion as correcting a car-centric design of the 1950s and 1960s that had cut the surrounding neighborhood off from the heart of the business district. Councilman Ricky Burgess was blunter: in the 1960s the city, in the name of urban renewal, plowed under a dozen streets, built a dozen new ones, and displaced countless families. Penn Circle, he said, was essentially a one-way highway around a thriving business district and it strangled the community. “A dozen,” “countless,” and “strangled” are a 2022 political description, not a 1960s engineering table. They are usable as the way the city’s own later leadership narrated the effect. They are not usable as proof of what the original drawings intended. Burgess’s phrase “thriving business district” actually supports the rescue premise. You do not strangle, in his metaphor, a place you were trying to abandon. You damage a place you were trying to hold.

The authority’s project page for the two-way conversion says the final phases would reconnect Harvard and Beatty streets, return two-way traffic to Euclid and Station, improve crosswalks, and install 8,000 linear feet of protected bike lanes. It says the ring road created four lanes of traffic in a neighborhood that did not require them, and that earlier phases had already converted Penn Circle East and Penn Circle South. Reconnecting the street grid, the page notes, had been called for repeatedly in community plans. A 2014 Next Pittsburgh account of the renaming says the city began making the circle’s streets two-way in 2010, and that segments were renamed to match the streets they joined outside the loop, so that a square imposed on the map could be read again as Centre, Euclid, and Station rather than as a single orbital brand. The same account describes the early-1960s project as having destroyed nearly a million square feet of small shops. That area figure is the publication’s, and it sits beside ELDI’s business counts rather than replacing them. Square feet and shop counts are different units. Both point at a commercial fabric that was physically removed, not merely rebranded.

The design logic is legible even if one grants every benevolent motive. A shop on a two-way street lives on people who pass it on the way to something else. A shop inside a pedestrian mall lives on people who have already decided to come to the mall. A four-lane one-way ring makes the second trip possible for a driver and makes the first trip worse for everyone who used the old grid to reach a store, a church, or a friend two blocks over. Deliveries, visibility, and the habit of stopping change when the curb disappears. ELDI’s history uses the word “inadvertently” for the loss of shoppers. Inadvertence is not innocence of consequences forever. It is a claim about what the planners were aiming at when they drew the circle. The aim was competitive retail. The mechanism was suburban geometry dropped into a neighborhood that had been urban. The mechanism could fail the aim without the aim having been a fraud.

Housing was part of the same drawing

It is tempting to tell this story as a retail story only, because “mall” is in the title. The ELDI history will not allow it. The towers and the townhouse clusters were not a side effect that arrived from a different agency with a different theory. They were part of the redevelopment that cleared houses to build the new pattern. More than 2,000 rental units, three towers of twenty stories, a damaged culture of ownership, families moving away: that is a housing revolution conducted in the name of a shopping rescue. A neighborhood can lose customers because the road is wrong and lose neighbors because the replacement housing does not fit the people who were displaced or the people who might have stayed. BikePGH’s claim that high-rises were not enough to rehouse the 1,200 families whose homes were removed is a specific version of that gap. If the numbers are right, the project demolished more households than the new towers functionally replaced, even while it added a large rental count on paper. If the numbers are soft, the qualitative point in the ELDI history still stands: ownership gave way to a rental landscape many residents experienced as a break, not as a gift.

Public housing is not a villain in this chapter, and it is not a footnote. The families who lived in the towers were East Liberty residents. A history that treats their buildings only as the cause of blight repeats the original planning error, which was to treat housing as a mass to be arranged around a retail diagram. The ELDI history itself moves from the towers to boarded buildings, disrepair, and rising crime, and it says community leaders could not agree on a strategy. That sequence is a description of the 1970s aftermath, not a finding that the presence of low-income tenants was the hidden purpose of the 1960s plan. The purpose on the page is competition with suburban malls. The housing was an instrument and a consequence. Crime, when the history says it soared, is part of the aftermath the way it is part of Homewood’s record: real, damaging, and not the identity of everyone who lived there. This chapter does not have a separate crime series for East Liberty, and it will not borrow one.

Who gets blamed when a rescue fails

BikePGH’s essay exists because the pedestrian mall became the convenient corpse. Whenever someone proposes closing a street to cars, a Pittsburgh argument reaches for East Liberty and says the mall killed it. The essay’s reply is that blaming only the car-free block misremembers the project. If the authority had merely shut Penn Avenue to cars and changed nothing else, the essay says, a critic could test that single variable. What happened instead was mass demolition, a high-speed ring, surface parking, and a housing replacement that thinned the neighborhood. The essay also argues that failed pedestrian malls elsewhere sat in cities that were losing population and therefore losing foot traffic. It asserts that between 1969 and 1986 Pittsburgh lost more than 150,000 residents, and that East Liberty lost more than 4,500 people between 1969 and 2000 from the project and from broader demographic change. This chapter does not adopt the citywide 150,000 figure, because it is not tied here to a census table for those exact years. It does adopt the essay’s structural point, which matches the ELDI history: the mall was one piece of a reconstruction that suburbanized the streets around it. A fair test of “pedestrian malls never work” cannot be run on a district that also lost its grid, its houses, and its through traffic.

The fair test also cannot be run backward into malice. It is possible to say the design was wrong, the execution destructive, and the commercial result a collapse from 575 businesses to 98, without saying anyone sat down to produce the collapse. Large interventions fail in characteristic ways. They trust a diagram over a habit. They count parking spaces and forget the trip that was not a parking trip. They clear “obsolete” blocks that were doing uncounted work as neighborhoods. They measure success at the opening and leave the ten-year retail count to a later generation. East Liberty’s later generation included the community plans that demanded the grid back, the 2010 start of two-way conversion, the renaming that erased Penn Circle as a single name, and the 2022 contract that treated the ring as a flaw to be corrected at a cost of $7.2 million for one phase. Spending public money to undo public work is as close as a city comes to a written apology. The apology is about results. Flisram’s “design flaw” is still not the same sentence as “they meant it to fail.”

What the undoing can and cannot prove

Reconnection is not time travel. Two-way Euclid and Station streets, bike lanes, and restored names do not reopen Mansmann’s or put back the nearly million square feet of shops Next Pittsburgh says were destroyed. They change the conditions for whoever is trying to use the district now. The URA’s theory, stated in 2022, is that neighborhood-scale streets increase access and safety and stitch the business district back to the residential streets the ring had cut off. That theory is the inverse of the 1960s theory, which bet that a faster road and a mall-like core would beat the suburbs at their own game. Both theories are attempts to save or restore commerce. The second exists because the first’s retail trajectory, on ELDI’s numbers, went from a 1959 peak through 292 shops in 1970 to 98 in 1977. A project that needs a half-century correction was not a small miscalculation in signage. It was a reorganization of movement. Calling it a miscalculation in purpose is the error to avoid. The planners reorganized movement on purpose. The shoppers’ response was the part they did not get.

East Liberty’s later revival, which Next Pittsburgh could already call impressive when it wrote about the renaming, creates a second temptation: to treat the undoing as proof that the original neighborhood had to be destroyed in order to be reborn. The documents do not say that. They say a commercial center was rebuilt to compete, declined, and was then partly reconnected. What happened in the years between 98 shops and a new investment cycle includes disinvestment, crime, and argument among leaders, on the ELDI account, and includes the people who lived in the housing the project built. Their decades are not a blank space between two planning diagrams. A chapter about the mall that nearly killed the district owes them the acknowledgment that “nearly” is doing work. The district was not erased in the way some renewal areas were erased. It was badly reorganized, commercially gutted on the published shop counts, and still sufficiently a place that later plans could talk about reconnecting it rather than inventing it. Survival at that cost is not a compliment to the ring road. It is the reason the ring road could be converted instead of merely memorialized.

A commercial district is a set of habits, not a diagram

The ELDI history’s shop counts are the chapter’s best way to watch a habit break. Five hundred seventy-five businesses in 1959 means a district dense enough that a person could do a day’s errands without treating each store as a destination. Two hundred ninety-two in 1970 means that density had already been cut nearly in half while the new roads were the new reality. Ninety-eight in 1977 means the mall experiment was no longer a young project having a bad season. Mansmann’s, closed the next year after nine decades, is a single name that stands in for the kind of anchor a neighborhood department store had been. A suburban mall replaces that anchor with a chain that can leave when the lease math changes. East Liberty’s plan tried to borrow the mall’s form without owning the suburban customer base the form had been built for. The customers who already lived nearby were the ones whose streets had been bulldozed to create the form. That is the inadvertence ELDI names, seen from the sidewalk rather than from the rendering.

Parking lots, which the history places along the four-lane ring, solve a problem for a driver who has already decided to come, and they create a problem for everyone who has to walk past them. A lot is a gap in the line of doors. A one-way ring is a gap in the directions a person can turn. Together they ask the old habit — stop on the way — to become a new habit: enter the loop, park, walk the mall, leave. If the new habit does not form at the scale of the old one, the doors close in the order the counts suggest. None of that requires a planner to have wanted the doors closed. It requires the planner to have been wrong about which habit was load-bearing. Later URA language about a car-centric flaw is the institution agreeing, sixty years on, that the load-bearing piece was the connection to the surrounding streets. Flisram’s 2022 statement and Burgess’s “one-way highway” metaphor are that agreement. They are also politicians’ sentences, stronger than a traffic study and weaker than a confession of bad faith. This chapter uses them as evidence of official regret about effects.

The housing half of the drawing belongs in the same habit. More than 2,000 rental units and three twenty-story towers, in the ELDI account, changed who lived within walking distance of whatever shops remained and how those residents related to ownership. BikePGH’s 1,200 homes removed, if accepted alongside rather than instead of the rental figure, suggests the project cleared a fabric of houses and built a different fabric back. Families who leave, which the ELDI history says they did, take the everyday trips with them. A mall cannot replace those trips with visitors from the suburbs if the ring road and the parking lots do not actually outperform the suburban malls that prompted the project. The 1977 count of 98 shops is what it looks like when neither the old customers nor the hoped-for new ones sustain the core. Crime, which the same history says soared as buildings boarded up, is a later layer on an already thinning commercial street. It is not the design.

Undoing the circle is a second plan, not a time machine

The conversion that began with two-way traffic in 2010 and reached a $7.2 million final phase in 2022 is large enough to prove the first plan’s geometry was still in the ground, doing the work it was built to do, long after the shops it was built to save had dwindled. Renaming the segments so they read as the streets outside the loop is a symbolic reversal and a practical one. A square called Penn Circle teaches drivers they are on a ring. Streets called Euclid, Station, Centre, and their kin teach drivers they are in a neighborhood that continues. The authority’s project page adds the physical list: Harvard and Beatty reconnected, crosswalks rebuilt, 8,000 linear feet of protected bike lanes, four lanes reduced to a scale the neighborhood’s demand did not require. Community plans had asked for the grid back repeatedly, the authority notes, which means the critique was not invented for a groundbreaking press release. It had been the neighborhood’s planning position before the final contract.

None of that repaves 1959. Next Pittsburgh’s figure of nearly a million square feet of small shops destroyed, and ELDI’s fall from 575 businesses to 98, describe a stock of commerce that two-way traffic cannot resurrect by itself. What two-way traffic can do is stop punishing the businesses that exist now for a diagram drawn against a suburban rival in the 1960s. The later revival Next Pittsburgh called impressive when it wrote about the renaming sits on top of that correction and on top of investment that has its own controversies about who the new district is for. This chapter does not audit those controversies. It refuses the moral that the original demolition was a necessary prelude to revival. The documents show a rescue that failed its retail purpose and a later public effort to remove pieces of the rescue. They do not show a planner in the 1960s aiming at the vacant storefronts of 1977. Intended for good, inadvertent in the loss of shoppers: that remains the sentence the neighborhood’s own development history offers, and it is the sentence that keeps this account from becoming a conspiracy.

There is a civic habit, after a failure this large, of promoting the diagram to a villain with a motive. The $68 million and 500 acres in the ELDI history are big enough to feel intentional in the malicious sense, because nobody spends that kind of public money by accident. The accident, if inadvertence is the right word, was not the spending. The spending was chosen. The accident was the prediction that a ring road and a mall-shaped core would hold the shoppers the suburbs were taking. A prediction can be confident, expensive, and wrong. East Liberty’s published retail path, from a 1959 peak of 575 businesses to 292 in 1970 and 98 in 1977, is the record of the prediction failing in public. The towers and the rental clusters are the record of a housing prediction made in the same project, that a new residential form could replace the houses the roads required to be removed. Families moving away, which the history reports, is the residential prediction failing beside the commercial one. Later officials could call the geometry a flaw and still be describing a flaw in foresight. Foresight is not the same act as sabotage, and the neighborhood’s own sentence — intended for good — is the one that fits the documents this chapter is willing to use. The ring was later converted because the prediction failed, not because the prediction had been a disguise for an intended ruin. Shoppers left a district the plan had meant to hold.

What remains disputed

The business counts of 575, 292, and 98 come from the community-development history without a reproduced methodology. The “nearly a million square feet” of demolished shops is a journalistic figure. The 1,200 homes and the more than 2,000 rental units come from different authors and count different things. BikePGH’s citywide population-loss claim for 1969–1986 and its neighborhood loss of more than 4,500 people are not adopted here as census findings. The 1969 installation and 1986 removal of the Penn Avenue mall are that essay’s dates; ELDI’s history describes the project as a 1960s reconstruction without pinning those two years in the passage used here. Burgess’s “dozen streets” and “countless” families are rhetorical totals. Crime “soaring” is the ELDI history’s qualitative account, not a table. Whether the pedestrian mall, the ring road, the demolitions, the housing replacement, or the city’s broader population loss did the largest share of the commercial damage remains a live argument, which is why BikePGH and the later URA statements do not fully agree on what to put in the first clause. They agree that the 1960s project failed its commercial purpose. They do not require, and this chapter does not make, the claim that failure was the purpose.

Evidence Ledger

  • East Liberty Development, Inc., neighborhood history, for the suburban-mall purpose, the $68 million and 500-acre description, Penn Circle, housing totals, and the 1959–1977 business counts: eastliberty.org.
  • Urban Redevelopment Authority, August 10, 2022 notice on the $7.2 million final phase, with the Flisram and Burgess statements: ura.org news.
  • Urban Redevelopment Authority, Penn Circle two-way conversion project page, for the 1960s ring, reconnecting Harvard and Beatty, and the 8,000 feet of bike lanes: ura.org project page.
  • Next Pittsburgh, on the renaming, the 2010 two-way start, and the scale of shop demolition: nextpittsburgh.com.
  • BikePGH, May 19, 2020, arguing that the pedestrian mall alone does not explain the decline: bikepgh.org.

This chapter is an original public expansion of PittsburghEverything’s Steel City Stories. It does not replace a Google Drive FULL MASTER.

Archival photographs relevant to this chapter. Sourced from Wikimedia Commons with attribution — not modern stock art.

SOUTH FRONT AND EAST SIDE - Penn and Liberty Avenues (Commercial Buildings), Harper Building, 723-725 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, PA

SOUTH FRONT AND EAST SIDE - Penn and Liberty Avenues (Commercial Buildings), Harper Building, 723-725 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, PA

Wikimedia Commons · SOUTH FRONT AND EAST SIDE - Penn and Liberty Avenues (Commercial Buildings), Harper Building, 723-725 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, PA HABS PA,2-PITBU,47-2.tif · Unknown · Public domain

Art Deco row, Penn Avenue, East Liberty, 1999 - Smena 8m

Art Deco row, Penn Avenue, East Liberty, 1999 - Smena 8m

Wikimedia Commons · Art Deco row, Penn Avenue, East Liberty, 1999 - Smena 8m.jpg · Cbaile19 · CC0

Strip District from Frank Curto Park

Strip District from Frank Curto Park

Wikimedia Commons · Strip District from Frank Curto Park.jpg · Cbaile19 · CC BY-SA 3.0

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