Skip to main content
Back to Steel City Stories
The Decade Homewood Was Left to Fight for Itself — Steel City Stories
HistoryChapter 32 of 4118 min read

The Decade Homewood Was Left to Fight for Itself

Steel City Stories

Preparing the first passage.

Steel City Stories · Chapter 32

Homewood’s late-century crisis is often told as a character study. The records tell it as a collision. Population, housing, a damaged business street, the regional loss of industrial wages, illegal drug markets, and the institutions residents kept building are all in the same decades, and none of them is a substitute for the others. Crime is part of that history. It is not the neighborhood’s identity. Ethnicity is part of the demographic record. It is not an explanation that this chapter will use, because the sources that blame a people rather than a set of decisions are the sources that made abandonment sound natural.

The population series published by the University of Pittsburgh’s Center for Social and Urban Research is the spine. Combining Homewood North, Homewood West, and Homewood South from the census, the center’s 2011 neighborhood report counts 31,260 residents in 1940, 30,235 in 1950, 26,971 in 1960, 20,266 in 1970, 15,158 in 1980, 11,511 in 1990, 9,283 in 2000, and 6,442 in 2010. From 1940 to 2010 that is a fall of more than 79 percent. The decade drops are not a gentle slope. The center calculates 24.9 percent lost from 1960 to 1970, 25.2 percent from 1970 to 1980, 24.1 percent from 1980 to 1990, 19.4 percent from 1990 to 2000, and 30.6 percent from 2000 to 2010. If “the decade” has to be named, the 1980s are the years when an already falling neighborhood took another quarter of its people while the region’s steel employment broke and the crack economy arrived. The title fits that decade only if the decades on either side stay visible. Homewood was not fine in 1979 and ruined in 1989. It was absorbing shocks that had started earlier and did not stop when the calendar turned.

A neighborhood that changed before it emptied

The racial composition of Homewood changed earlier than the worst population loss, which is the fact that blocks any story equating Black residency with decline. A Rivers of Steel community history, drawing on local research, reports the Black population at about 25 percent in 1950, more than 70 percent in 1960, and nearly 98 percent in 1990. A 1977 neighborhood profile from the same university center says that in 1970 Black residents were 93.1 percent of Homewood-Brushton, against 20.2 percent in the city. By 1970, in other words, Homewood was already a Black neighborhood in the census sense, and it still held 20,266 people in the later three-part count. The emptying that followed cannot be narrated as the moment the neighborhood “became” Black. That moment, on these figures, was already past while the business street, the schools, and the churches were still the everyday map.

How the earlier change happened is a story about gates, not about essences. The Rivers of Steel history describes Homewood as one of the few neighborhoods open to African American home seekers when the Lower Hill was taken for the Civic Arena and urban renewal. It describes one-family houses becoming multi-unit rentals because many newcomers could not buy. It describes federal subsidies that made a new suburban house easier to finance than an old city house to repair. And it quotes a research account, Sapolsky 1987, of real estate agents urging white owners to sell below value because the neighborhood was changing, then selling those houses at higher prices to Black buyers. The operators profited. Everyone else, the history says, blamed everyone else. That last sentence is the warning. A chapter that picks up the blame and assigns it to the families who moved in, or to the families who moved out as if departure were a racial instinct rather than a subsidized market, is repeating the confusion the real estate practice depended on. The documented mechanisms are displacement from the Hill, a restricted housing map, blockbusting as described in that research, and public policy that cheapened the suburbs.

The Heinz Endowments’ 2018 portrait of the 15208 ZIP code remembers a different Homewood Avenue, the one with two movie theaters and a G.C. Murphy, a street where residents say they did not have to leave the neighborhood to shop. It also records the arrival of people displaced by the Arena, the shift from a mix of German, Irish, Italian, and African American families toward a Black majority, and the claim that at the beginning of 1968 the district was still thriving. Then King was murdered, and Homewood Avenue, in that account, went up in flames. An Allegheny County community profile is more measured and still severe: riots and looting in Homewood and the Hill lasted about two days and did irreparable damage to businesses, feeding the decline of both business districts. Chapter 30 separates the Hill’s nights of fire from its memorial march and refuses unverified citywide totals. Here the local claim is narrower. Whatever the exact hour count, both the county profile and the later magazine treat April 1968 as a commercial wound in Homewood, not as the invention of the neighborhood’s problems and not as their only cause.

Housing stopped behaving like a ladder

The 1977 profile, using a 1974 estimate, already shows a neighborhood coming apart in the housing numbers rather than in a slogan. Homewood-Brushton’s population was estimated at 19,917, down 15 percent since 1970, against a smaller citywide decline. Housing units decreased during the 1960s and again from 1970 to 1974. Of occupied units, 46.8 percent were owner-occupied, compared with 54.2 percent citywide. The vacancy rate was 11.9 percent, higher than the city’s. The average value of an owner-occupied house in 1970 was $11,200 in the neighborhood and $14,800 in the city. Those are not crime statistics. They are a picture of a housing market that was already cheaper, emptier, and less owner-occupied than the city around it, before the 1980s are usually said to have begun.

The 2011 university report looks back at what residents and community-development corporations tried to do with that market. In the 1980s the Homewood Brushton Revitalization and Development Corporation focused on retail along Homewood Avenue and on constructing nearly 50 housing units nearby. Crime and other operational problems were blamed, the report says, citing the historian Roy Lubove, for the failure of many businesses those efforts recruited. Later campaigns renovated Westinghouse High School in 2001 and the Homewood Carnegie Library branch in 2003, and produced new facilities for the YWCA in 1998, the Afro-American Music Institute in 2003, and the YMCA in 2005. The Community College of Allegheny County opened a Homewood campus in 1981. Faison School opened in 2004. The report’s verdict is carefully unsentimental: the projects improved lives and did not reverse large-scale vacancy, disinvestment, or declining home equity. Housing values sat among the city’s lowest, reflecting what the authors call market failure rooted in population loss, blight, and the region’s economic restructuring.

That last phrase is the bridge to the steel chapter, and it should stay a bridge rather than a merger. Homewood was not a mill town in the sense Homestead was. It was a city neighborhood whose residents, the Heinz portrait argues, had used industrial wages — including steel work, one of the few jobs the magazine says was open to a Black man in Pittsburgh without a college degree — to support families. When that occupation disappeared, out-migration followed. The magazine dates a regional marker: unemployment in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area reached 17.1 percent in January 1983. This chapter does not re-litigate the steel employment series. It uses the connection the neighborhood sources themselves draw. Job loss was not a metaphor. It was a reason households left, a reason stores lost customers, and a reason a development corporation could build fifty houses and still be describing failure a generation later.

The drug economy was real, and it was not everyone

The Heinz portrait is unusually direct about the illegal market, which is why it can be used without turning to rumor. During the same years the steel jobs vanished, it says, the crack epidemic emerged, along with the War on Drugs, and a disproportionate number of neighborhood residents were incarcerated. The next sentences are the ones a crime-only telling always cuts. Most people, the magazine says, did not surrender to crack or fall into crime. They worked the jobs they could find and raised children. They attended more than two dozen neighborhood churches. They used block clubs, a practice of Operation Better Block, formed in 1970 to push neighborhood improvements. Smaller clubs later clustered as the organization changed shape. That is a sourced picture of a decade: a destructive illegal economy, a punitive public response that fell hard inside the neighborhood, and a majority of residents whose documented life was work, church, and block organization.

The 2011 report’s reference to crime is institutional rather than lurid. Crime is named as one reason 1980s commercial recruitment failed. It is not given a homicide table in the passages this chapter relies on, and this chapter will not import a body count from memory or from a later headline. Violence had victims, and those victims were Homewood residents as well as anyone passing through. Saying so does not require a theory that the neighborhood is violent by nature, or that the people who stayed were the cause rather than the witnesses and, too often, the injured. A history that omits the drug market is a pamphlet. A history that stops at the drug market is the outside narrative the magazine was written to answer. The proportion is the point. Churches and block clubs are not a sentimental epilogue. In the sources, they are contemporary with the crisis, which means they are evidence about the same decade, not a consolation prize awarded after the decade ended.

Operation Better Block’s 1970 founding also resets the clock on “left to fight for itself.” Resident organization did not begin when outsiders discovered the neighborhood in a later revitalization plan. It was underway while the 1970 population of 20,266 was falling toward the 1980 count of 15,158, and while the 1974 housing profile was already recording vacancy and lower values. Fighting for the neighborhood, in the record, looks like a community-development corporation, a community-college campus, a high school, a library, a Y, and a set of churches that the magazine could still count in the dozens. It also looks like people leaving, which is its own rational response to a labor market and a housing market that had stopped paying. Departure and devotion are both in the census and in the institutional list. Treating only the departure as the real story is how a place gets described as empty while thousands of people are still there. In 1990 the three Homewood tracts still held 11,511 people. In 2010 they held 6,442. Those are not ruins in the sense of zero. They are neighborhoods that became smaller, poorer, and older, which is the description the university report borrows from Lubove’s account of the mill towns and applies to Homewood.

Disinvestment is a decision repeated until it looks like weather

Disinvestment is a word that sounds like a force of nature and behaves like a series of choices: where banks lend, where the city spends, which commercial streets get a second chance after a fire, which families can convert a wage into a mortgage, which vacant house is boarded and which is left open. The documents here do not contain a single ordinance labeled “abandon Homewood.” They contain the outcomes that let a reader see abandonment as a pattern. Owner-occupancy below the city rate by 1974. Values below the city average in 1970. A business district described as irreparably damaged after 1968. A 1980s attempt to rebuild retail that the neighborhood’s own development corporation could not make stick. A 2011 assessment that vacancy and lost equity had not been turned around by a list of real, funded institutions. Each of those is a decision point at which public and private capital could have arrived at the scale of the loss. The record of arrival is the list of schools, libraries, and community buildings. The record of insufficiency is the population table.

The Fair Housing Act is part of this pattern and has to be handled without a morality play. The county profile notes that the Civil Rights Act of 1968, through fair housing, gave Black residents a legal right to live where they chose, and that some more affluent Black families left Homewood for Penn Hills, Plum, and Monroeville. The profile ties that move to the drop from 20,266 in 1970 to 15,158 in 1980. Read crudely, the sentence blames integration for neighborhood decline. Read against the rest of the file, it says something colder. People with the means to leave a damaged commercial district and a weakening housing market did so when the law finally allowed a wider map. Their leaving removed income and leadership from Homewood. The cause of their legal freedom was a civil-rights statute. The cause of the conditions they left sits in the earlier clearance, the real estate practices, the business-district damage, and the regional job loss. A politics that scolds either the families who left or the families who could not leave has lost the thread. The thread is resources.

Outside narratives had a simpler product. Once crime statistics became the thing a television crew could film, Homewood could be used as a backdrop whose residents were implied rather than interviewed. The magazine’s insistence on churches and block clubs is a direct reply to that product. So is the university report’s table of institutions founded or rebuilt from 1981 through 2005. A visitor who sees only a vacant house is not wrong about the house. The visitor is wrong if the house becomes the only institution acknowledged on the block. The Carnegie branch, the high school, the churches, and the development corporation were not later inventions designed to soften a chapter. They were how residents insisted the neighborhood still had a public life while the census was recording the departures.

What the 1980s did, and what they did not finish

Stack the decade against the table. In 1980 the three tracts held 15,158 people. In 1990 they held 11,511, a 24.1 percent fall, almost the same rate as the 1970s. During those ten years the region’s steel employment, measured in the companion chapter’s university series, fell from 84,500 to 27,700. Metropolitan unemployment, in the magazine’s dating, hit 17.1 percent in January 1983. Crack and incarceration entered the Heinz account as facts of the same span. Operation Better Block was already a teenager, having been formed in 1970. The community college campus arrived in 1981, early enough to be part of the decade rather than a reward after it. Nearly fifty housing units were built and many recruited businesses failed. At the end of the decade Homewood was smaller and still organized. That is the sentence a single crime narrative cannot produce, because organization does not photograph as easily as a raid.

The decades after did not restore the 1980 population, which is why a chapter called a decade cannot pretend the fight ended when the steel statistics stabilized. Another 24 percent was gone by 2000 in relative terms from 1990, and 30.6 percent more by 2010. The institutional improvements of the 1990s and 2000s are listed by the university authors in the same breath as the admission that property-market trends did not reverse. Fighting for a neighborhood and winning a stable population are different outcomes. Homewood’s record shows the first more clearly than the second. Residents, churches, and block clubs kept a civic structure inside a market failure. They did not, on the published census trail, get the people back. Saying they were “left to fight” is accurate only if the leaving is assigned to the pattern of investment, not to a verdict that nobody outside cared at all. Governments, foundations, and development corporations did spend money. The 2011 report’s point is that the spending did not match the scale of vacancy and lost equity. Scale is the indictment. Absence of any effort is not the fact.

The street the census cannot see

Population tables are truthful and incomplete. They cannot show a Tuesday. The sources that get closest are the ones that list what people did when the numbers were going the wrong way. Operation Better Block’s block clubs are the most ordinary and therefore the most important. A block club is not a grant cycle. It is neighbors agreeing to watch a vacant house, to push a city department, to keep a corner from becoming the only story told about the street. The Heinz account places those clubs inside the same years as crack and the steel layoff, which means the neighborhood’s public life was not waiting for the crisis to pass before it resumed. It was concurrent. More than two dozen churches, in that same portrait, are a count of institutions, not a claim that attendance solved unemployment. Churches in a Black Pittsburgh neighborhood have long done the work that a thinner municipal presence leaves on the table: meals, funerals, political meetings, a room that is not a police station and not a vacant storefront. Naming them is a factual correction to the crime montage. It is not an argument that faith replaced wages.

The development corporation’s nearly fifty housing units belong in that ordinary register too. Fifty houses will not offset a fall from 15,158 people to 11,511. They will matter to the families who got one. The university report’s willingness to say the units and the retail recruitment did not stabilize the market is what keeps the chapter from either sneering at the effort or pretending it was sufficient. Roy Lubove’s judgment, as cited there, that crime and operational problems undid many of the recruited businesses, has to be quoted as a judgment. It does not identify which businesses, which years, or which offenses. It does establish that people who were trying to rebuild Homewood Avenue in the 1980s ran into the illegal economy as a practical obstacle. Residents were on both sides of that obstacle: the ones recruited to open a shop, the ones harmed by the market that made the shop impossible, and the ones the Heinz portrait insists were doing neither the opening nor the harm but were raising children between them.

Westinghouse High School sits in the later list for a 2001 renovation, which is a reminder that the school outlasted the decade the title names. A neighborhood school is a bet that children will still be there. The enrollment implied by a drop toward 6,442 residents in 2010 is a harder bet than the enrollment implied by 26,971 in 1960. Renovating the building, reopening a library branch, adding a YMCA and a YWCA and a music institute, placing a community-college campus in 1981: each is a recorded refusal to treat the census line as a closing notice. The 2011 authors add the refusal to the other side of the ledger in one motion. Lives improved. The property market did not turn. A reader who wants a victory story can stop at the ribbon cuttings. A reader who wants a failure story can stop at 6,442. The report requires both stops. So does any account that calls the decade a fight rather than a collapse with no one in it.

No people left to blame

The easiest false chapter is ethnic. It notices that Homewood became a Black neighborhood and that Homewood became poorer, and it treats the first fact as the cause of the second. The dates will not cooperate. The large shift in racial composition, on the Rivers of Steel account, was underway between 1950 and 1960, when the Black share moved from about a quarter to more than 70 percent. The three-tract population was still 26,971 in 1960 and 20,266 in 1970. The magazine’s memory of a self-sufficient Homewood Avenue sits at the start of 1968, after that demographic change and before the fires and the steel break. If race were the cause, the neighborhood would have failed on the way to 1960, not after it had already become the place those memories describe. What changed after the demographic transition were the commercial damage of 1968, the exit of some higher-income Black households once fair housing opened other suburbs, the regional industrial unemployment of the early 1980s, the housing market’s vacancy and value gap, and the arrival of a more destructive drug economy. Those are causes with dates. Skin is not a cause. It is a fact about who was present to bear the causes.

The other easy false chapter blames the people who left, or the people who stayed. The county profile’s note that affluent Black families moved to Penn Hills, Plum, and Monroeville can be twisted into a story of desertion. The twist ignores why a family with options would leave a business district described as irreparably damaged and a housing market already showing higher vacancy and lower values. It also ignores who could not move. The families who remained were not a residue that failed a test of character. They were the people for whom the restricted map, the wage collapse, and the cost of leaving still applied. Churches and block clubs are the institutional trace of their decision to stay and to make the staying public. Incarceration, where the magazine says it fell disproportionately, removed some of those people from the block entirely, which is a state action as well as a neighborhood loss. A history of crime that does not mention the prison system is incomplete. A history of the prison system that treats every resident as a case is the ethnic story in a new uniform.

Homewood’s fight, then, is not a metaphor pasted over a pathology. It is the name for a set of organizations and habits that the documents record in the same years as the losses. The decade at the center, the 1980s, took another quarter of the population and did not take the churches, the block clubs, the development corporation, or the new community-college campus. Later decades took still more people and added more buildings that the university report refuses to call a turnaround. The identity that survives that record is a neighborhood that was left with too much of the cost and not with an empty stage. Crime remains in the story because the sources put it there, as a destroyer of businesses and as a reason some residents went to prison. It does not remain as the definition of the people who outnumbered it.

What remains disputed

The two-day description of 1968 damage in the county profile is coarser than the citywide chronology in Chapter 30, which runs the official emergency from April 4 to April 12 and separates a memorial march from the fires. Homewood-specific fire and arrest counts are not settled in the sources used here. The claim that Homewood Avenue was still thriving in early 1968 is a magazine recollection, not a census finding. Population totals depend on which tracts are grouped; the 31,260-to-6,442 series is the university center’s three-tract Homewood, while the 1977 profile studies Homewood-Brushton and estimates 19,917 people in 1974. Those geographies should not be forced into one unmarked number. Crime volume, homicide counts, and the precise share of residents touched by incarceration are not established in the documents this chapter quotes; the Heinz account says the impact was disproportionate and that most residents were not participants. Causes of business failure in the 1980s are attributed partly to crime by way of Lubove, which is a historical judgment rather than a police annual report reproduced here. The Sapolsky account of real estate practice is reported through a community history and should be read as that chain of citation. None of these open arguments restores ethnic blame as an explanation. The disputed items are counts, boundaries, and shares of causation among disinvestment, housing extraction, job loss, drugs, and resident response. The forbidden shortcut is a people.

Evidence Ledger

  • University Center for Social and Urban Research, Homewood neighborhood report, March 2011, for the 1940–2010 population table, housing-market failure, and the list of community institutions: UCSUR Homewood report.
  • Allegheny County, “Homewood: A Community Profile,” for 1968 business-district damage, fair-housing out-migration, and the 1970–1980 population drop: alleghenycounty.us.
  • University of Pittsburgh community profile, Homewood-Brushton, 1977, for 1974 population, 1970 racial composition, vacancy, ownership, and housing value: 1977 Homewood-Brushton profile.
  • Heinz Endowments, “15208,” 2018, for churches, Operation Better Block, the 17.1 percent unemployment marker, and the account of crack and incarceration beside resident life: heinz.org.
  • Rivers of Steel community history of Homewood and neighboring districts, for the 1950–1990 demographic shift and the housing-market mechanisms: riversofsteel.com.

This chapter is an original public expansion of PittsburghEverything’s Steel City Stories. It does not replace a Google Drive FULL MASTER.

Archival photographs relevant to this chapter. Sourced from Wikimedia Commons with attribution — not modern stock art.

Homewood Houses

Homewood Houses

Wikimedia Commons · Homewood Houses.jpg · EricMiller214 · CC BY-SA 3.0

HomewoodCarnegieLibraryofPittsburgh

HomewoodCarnegieLibraryofPittsburgh

Wikimedia Commons · HomewoodCarnegieLibraryofPittsburgh.jpg · Lee Paxton · CC BY-SA 4.0

East Busway Homewood stop crop

East Busway Homewood stop crop

Wikimedia Commons · East Busway Homewood stop crop.jpg · hhm8 · CC BY 2.0

Related Stories