Skip to main content
Back to Steel City Stories
The Week Pittsburgh’s Grief Became Fire — Steel City Stories
HistoryChapter 30 of 4118 min read

The Week Pittsburgh’s Grief Became Fire

Steel City Stories

Preparing the first passage.

Steel City Stories · Chapter 30

On the evening of April 4, 1968, news that the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. had been shot on a Memphis motel balcony reached a Pittsburgh that already knew how to mourn in public and how to argue about what mourning was allowed to look like. King died that night. The Hill District did not burn that night. The distinction is the whole method of this chapter. Grief arrived on Thursday. The documented outbreak of breaking glass, fire, and arrest began the next evening and ran, by the City’s own later accounting, through April 12. A permitted memorial march also moved through the Hill during that same week. Photographs, memories, and headlines have spent half a century pressing those events into one picture. The record does not.

Pittsburgh’s Commission on Human Relations, in its 1968 annual report, described what followed the assassination as the first major disturbance of its type in the City’s history, one episode in a national wave that touched Pittsburgh and 113 other American cities. The commission located the start of the incidents in the Hill District and said the major part of the disorders occurred there, while some other predominantly Black neighborhoods were also affected. That sentence is doing quiet work. It refuses the later habit of treating “the Hill” as a synonym for every damaged block from Homewood to the North Side, and it refuses the opposite habit of pretending the Hill was the only place the week landed.

A district already opened by bulldozers

Anyone who writes April 1968 as if the Hill were an intact neighborhood suddenly struck by national news is writing over a demolition that was already a decade old. The Lower Hill had been cleared for the Civic Arena and the redevelopment that surrounded it. Residents who remained on the Upper Hill could see, from their own streets, what public power had already decided a Black neighborhood was worth when a civic vision wanted the land. The Post-Gazette’s later reconstruction of the week, published for the fiftieth anniversary, put the National Guard’s headquarters at the Arena and noted that many Hill residents experienced the military presence as an occupation of ground that had been taken from them in the 1950s. That is a reported community reading of a photograph, not a headcount of troops. It belongs in the chapter because it explains why uniforms on Centre Avenue were not a neutral backdrop.

The commercial streets that would be hit hardest were not an abstract “business district.” They were the stores, markets, and shops that had survived the earlier clearance and that still organized daily life for people who shopped, worked, and were owed credit on those blocks. A scholarly account in Western Pennsylvania History later argued that the Hill’s central business district, already weakened by Civic Arena redevelopment, was effectively destroyed, and that more than 100 businesses, many of them white-owned, never returned. The commission’s report does not adopt that “more than 100” figure, so this chapter will not treat it as an official inventory. It will treat it as a historian’s claim that has to sit beside the fire bureau’s dollar estimate, not replace it. The political point inside the claim is older than the fires: a neighborhood can be described as violent in a week when the longer violence was a planning map.

King’s assassination did not invent Pittsburgh’s racial order. It arrived in a city where the Lower Hill clearance, employment discrimination, and segregated housing markets were already public facts. The Commission on Human Relations existed because those facts had produced an institution charged with watching them. On Friday, April 5, the commission’s chairman called an emergency meeting after a staff meeting in the commission’s office. The bureaucracy of civil rights and the bureaucracy of public safety were both in motion before the worst night. That sequence matters. The week was not a spontaneous combustion that left City Hall surprised and morally blank. Officials had a language for racial crisis. What they did not have, the commission later wrote, was a police force able to deal with the situation once it heightened.

Friday night is not Thursday night

The Post-Gazette’s anniversary narrative, built from newspapers and interviews, places the start of the trouble around 9:30 p.m., when a crowd broke into a meat market near the Zone 2 police station at Centre and Devilliers. From there, the account says, people moved down Centre, breaking storefront glass and windshields and ransacking stores. Police gathered at Crawford and Centre to keep the movement from reaching the Downtown business district. The commission’s report, written in the administrative voice of 1968, does not give that meat-market minute. It does fix the larger frame: assassination on April 4, disorders from April 4 to April 12, Hill District first. A reader can hold both. The official period includes the day of the assassination because that is when the City began counting the emergency. The street chronology that newspapers recorded places the first Hill break-ins on Friday evening.

Saturday brought firebombs through store windows on Centre and on the North Side, the Post-Gazette reported, and firefighters were pelted with rocks. A Perrysville Avenue drugstore burned. Stock boys put out flames at a North Side Giant Eagle. Those details are newspaper reconstruction, valuable because they show the week leaving the Hill, and they should not be silently upgraded into the commission’s table of citywide totals. By midnight Saturday, the same account says, suspects were packed into cells at the Zone 2 station. A Fraternal Order of Police fact-finding report, as summarized by the Post-Gazette, complained that “known black militants” had been allowed into the station to sort “the good guys from the bad guys,” and that rank-and-file officers read that decision as softness by a Black sergeant, Harvey Adams. Hill residents, the article notes, respected Adams for standing against racist conduct by other officers. Outside, a crowd of several hundred was said to be planning to storm the station. This is contested institutional memory: a police lodge’s report, retold by a newspaper, about a sergeant whose reputation split along the color line of the bureau. It is evidence of conflict inside the response. It is not a verified count of the crowd.

Sunday, April 7, was Palm Sunday, and it was also the day the Senator John Heinz History Center later called the worst day of rioting. The History Center reported 189 fires that day and “countless cases of looting.” The commission’s year-end total would be 505 fires for the whole disturbance, principally in the Hill. One hundred eighty-nine and five hundred five can both be true if the first is a single-day report and the second is the week. They cannot be added together. Nor can Sunday’s fires be used as a caption for every photograph taken on Sunday. That is the error this chapter exists to block.

The march was a different event on the same streets

The idea of a march, the Post-Gazette reported, came from NAACP president Byrd Brown shortly after the assassination. Alma Speed Fox, the organization’s executive director, secured permits. On Sunday she and her husband, Gerald, came into the Hill from church in Homewood and heard on the radio that the march into Downtown had been canceled. She had the permit in her purse. At Centre and Crawford, blue-helmeted police stood shoulder to shoulder. The newspaper account says police announced that the march would not proceed, and that Fox showed the permit to Public Safety Director David Craig, who had been telling march leaders he could not assure their safety or the city’s.

What happened next is the scene most often stolen by the riot caption. Fox, then 45, got down and went through a gap in the police line, then called to the people behind her. A Western Pennsylvania History article quotes her later recollection that she “scooted right under there and got to the other side,” and that Byrd Brown and David Craig negotiated her release after she was put in a police car, and passage for the marchers. She remembered the day, in that same article, as “a peaceful demonstration” in which “we gave honor to Dr. King.” The article puts the march at about 3,500 people, led by Fox, from the Freedom Center — the place now marked as Freedom Corner in Uptown — toward Point State Park. Police had tried to cancel it because of the disorders. The marchers insisted and were eventually allowed to proceed.

That paragraph has to be kept surgically separate from the fire count. The same Sunday, the History Center’s account and the newspaper’s photographs show smoke, looting, and Guardsmen. The Mainway supermarket fire sent black smoke over the Hill while people carried goods past officers and past families dressed for Palm Sunday church. Those are simultaneous facts. They are not the same fact. A reader who pastes the march photograph onto the fire photograph, or the fire photograph onto the march, is doing the work that official confusion and later mythology both found convenient. The march was permitted, contested, briefly blocked, and then allowed. Participants and the NAACP’s executive director described it as a memorial. The fires and the looting were the disorder the police and, soon, the Guard were there to stop. One street, Centre Avenue, held both. The historical sentence has to hold both without letting either cancel the other.

The Fox family made the split personal in a way no novelist should improve upon, because the newspaper already reported it. On Sunday evening Alma and Gerald Fox saw a television image of a young Black man facing a Guardsman. Gerald recognized a wristband he had just given their son, Carl. Carl Fox had been on National Guard duty and was told the 107th Artillery Battalion would assist Pittsburgh police. The Post-Gazette places him on Centre, in a line of Guardsmen, being confronted by people from the neighborhood, including a man known as Brother Phil. The article’s reconstruction of what Carl thought, and of the words shouted at him, comes from later memory. This chapter will not repeat interior thoughts or unverified dialogue. It will keep the documented structure: a Hill mother leading a memorial march, a Hill son in a Guard line on the same avenue, on the Sunday the History Center calls the worst day. That structure is already more exact than the word “riot” can bear.

What the City was willing to count

When the Commission on Human Relations closed the books on 1968, it did not offer a mood. It offered a table, written in the stiff prose of an annual report, and the table is the spine of any honest number in this story. One woman died some weeks later, the commission wrote, allegedly as a result of a firebombing. The adverb is the commission’s. This chapter will not drop it, will not name her from a source that does not appear here, and will not convert “allegedly” into a solved homicide. Thirty-three firemen and twelve policemen were injured. That is forty-five uniformed injuries, not a count of civilian wounded, and not the “36 injured” figure that appears in the later Western Pennsylvania History article. The two injury counts do not match. The commission’s is an official contemporary total of firefighters and police. The journal’s is a different casualty sentence — one dead, thirty-six injured — that may be mixing categories. Until a single incident log reconciles them, the official report’s split between the death allegation and the uniformed injuries is the figure this chapter will stand on.

Fires: 505, throughout the City but principally in the Hill District. Arrests: 926, including 199 juveniles, with 337 persons charged with felonies and 589 persons charged with misdemeanors or summary offenses. The arithmetic is a warning against double counting. Three hundred thirty-seven plus 589 is 926. The juveniles are included inside that total, not added on top of it. A sentence that says “926 arrests and also 199 juveniles and also 337 felonies” has invented a larger crackdown than the City recorded. The Post-Gazette’s anniversary narrative said police made 929 arrests. Three arrests separate the newspaper’s later retelling from the commission’s report. That is a small gap, and it is still a gap. The chapter uses 926.

The Bureau of Fire estimated property damage at $620,660. The commission immediately qualified its own number. Preliminary findings of a special task force appointed by the mayor, the report said, treated the loss as larger once theft of goods, lost trade, property abandoned in the critical areas, police overtime, and the cost of deploying State Police and National Guard troops were considered. The passage available from that report does not replace $620,660 with a second audited total. So the fire-bureau estimate stands as the only dollar figure this chapter will print, and the task force’s list stands as the reason that figure is a floor for physical fire loss rather than a full civic cost. Anyone who needs a rounder number — a million, ten million, “incalculable” — is leaving the document.

The mayor imposed a 7:00 p.m. curfew and banned the sale of alcoholic beverages for several days. The commission states that when it became evident Pittsburgh police could not deal with the situation, National Guardsmen and State Police were deployed. Those two sentences are verified institutional facts. They are not a troop count. A Western Pennsylvania History article reports that Governor Shafer ordered nearly 2,000 National Guardsmen and 300 state troopers to the Hill District, and the next day deployed 1,650 more to the North Side and Homewood. This chapter does not adopt those headcounts as established, because the commission report confirms the deployment and does not itemize the same numbers. The photographs do show troops: Guard vehicles on Centre at Roberts, a line in front of the Zone 2 station near Devilliers, soldiers at Homewood Avenue and Formosa Way on April 8 with smoke in the air, a headquarters at the Civic Arena. Presence is documented. A precise order of battle is not, in the sources this chapter is willing to treat as settled.

After the worst night, a different kind of patrol

The History Center’s account of the police collection places a turn on April 10. By then, it says, the majority of the riots had subsided, and Public Safety Director David W. Craig put twenty African American young men to work walking the Hill District and Homewood to encourage peace. They wore red fluorescent vests. Local papers called the effort Operation Red Shirt or the Red Smocks. Police reports called them the Red Vests. They acted as a patrol for about a day. As the state of emergency lifted, the History Center writes, the disturbances died down and the community looked toward rebuilding.

Twenty walkers in red vests are not a reconciliation. They are a documented tactic, small enough to count, late enough in the week to mark the difference between the nights of fire and the days of trying to keep the next night from starting. They also show the City reaching for Black residents as intermediaries once the uniforms had already been on the street. Whether that was partnership or a cheaper form of control is a judgment the records do not settle. What they settle is the date, the director’s name, the neighborhoods, the number twenty, and the fact that the vests belonged to the aftermath rather than to the Friday night at the meat market.

Western Pennsylvania History credits K. Leroy Irvis and the Rev. Jimmy Joe Robinson with walking the streets to calm people, and credits Craig and Sergeant Harvey Adams with keeping the police in check. It also records the counter-charge from business owners that Craig was too soft on looters. Those are judgments by participants and by a later historian, not verdicts. They belong beside the Red Vests because they describe the same problem: once the glass was broken, every further decision was accused of choosing a side. Softness and occupation were both available stories on Monday morning. The commission’s numbers do not choose between them. They say the week was bitter and costly, and they list the dead allegation, the injured firefighters and officers, the fires, the arrests, and the fire loss.

What the photographs cannot be asked to do

The fiftieth-anniversary photographs are some of the best evidence Pittsburgh has, and they are also the easiest evidence to misuse. A child on a Palm Sunday street with the Mainway smoke behind him is not a rioter. A Guardsman with a rifle at his chest is not proof that the march was a battle. Smoke over Homewood Avenue on April 8 is not a caption for the NAACP march on April 7. The National Guard at the Arena is not a picture of the Lower Hill clearance, even though the clearance is why the Arena was the bitter place to park a headquarters. Exact-date captions are the ethic. Where a repository or a newspaper gives April 7, April 8, or April 10, the date stays attached to the frame. Where a picture is simply “that week,” it cannot be promoted into the night of April 5 or the march permit.

The same rule applies to causes. Black community leaders, the Western Pennsylvania History article reports, argued that much of the attack fell on white business owners who made money in the Hill. That argument is part of the political history of the week. It is not a finding that every burned store fit the description, and it is not a license to treat merchants as a class that deserved fire. The commission’s report stays with conduct: burning, looting, vandalism, injury, arrest, and a death alleged to have followed a firebombing. Victims of those acts included whoever lived above a store, whoever worked in one, and whoever needed it open on Monday. The chapter can hold the leaders’ explanation and the victims’ loss in the same section because both are in the record. It cannot collapse them into a moral equation.

Nor does the week prove that Pittsburgh “exploded” out of nowhere, or that the Hill’s identity is the fire. The commission called it the first major disturbance of its type. Residents and later journalists described a place already cut by redevelopment. Both claims narrow the story in a useful way. Something new happened in the streets between April 5 and April 12. Something old had already happened to the blocks those streets served. The assassination was the national trigger the newspapers and the commission both used. The local fuel was visible before Memphis, in the cleared Lower Hill and in the unfinished argument about who the Hill’s commerce was for.

The week left the Hill, and then it left the headlines

The commission was explicit that the Hill held the major part of the disorders and that other predominantly Black neighborhoods were affected. The photographs make that concrete without letting it dissolve the map. On April 8, Post-Gazette photographers recorded smoke over Homewood Avenue and troops at Homewood Avenue and Formosa Way. The Saturday newspaper record, as retold in the anniversary narrative, already had fires on the North Side, including a Perrysville Avenue drugstore. Western Pennsylvania History names the Hill, Homewood, and the North Side together and describes a six-day span. Homewood’s later crisis, and the North Side’s later redevelopment fights, are other chapters. Here they matter only as a check on a Hill-only myth and on a whole-city myth. Downtown merchants were the threat police organized to stop at Crawford and Centre. The blocks that actually burned were the neighborhood commercial streets. The Golden Triangle was the place the march was trying to reach in honor of King, not the place the fire bureau’s loss was principally counted.

Duration is its own dispute inside the settled frame. The commission uses April 4 to April 12. The History Center says that by April 10 the majority of the riots had subsided and that the Red Vests walked as the emergency lifted. A six-day description in the journal article and a nine-day official window are not contradictions if one is counting peak street disorder and the other is counting the emergency the City still had open. What neither description supports is a single “day of rage” that can be filed under April 4. King was killed on the fourth. Pittsburgh’s counted fires, arrests, and curfew belong to the days that followed. The memorial march belongs to Sunday. The red vests belong to the tenth. A headline that needs one night will have to cut something true away.

The aftermath inside the commission’s own paragraph is easy to skip because it is not dramatic. The monetary cost was “considerable,” the report said, and then it did the unglamorous thing: it separated a fire-bureau estimate from a task-force warning that theft, lost trade, abandoned property, overtime, and troop deployment were additional costs. That separation is an argument about what a city chooses to call the price. A burned building photographs more clearly than a week of closed shops or a paycheck of police overtime. The Hill’s commercial loss, in the later historical claim, included businesses that never came back. If that claim holds, the week’s ledger did not close when the curfew lifted. It closed, badly, over years, in vacancies the Arena-era clearance had already taught the neighborhood how to recognize. Chapter 32 will meet Homewood on the far side of that same emergency. This chapter’s job is narrower: to keep April 4, the nights of fire, and the Sunday march from being melted into one caption.

What remains disputed

The size of the military deployment remains less settled than the fire and arrest totals. The journal article’s figures of nearly 2,000 Guardsmen and 300 state troopers, plus 1,650 more the next day, are a published historical claim. They are not repeated in the Commission on Human Relations report used here, so they stay outside the chapter’s settled numbers. The injury accounting is also unsettled: forty-five firefighters and police in the commission report, against a later “thirty-six injured” that does not specify who is included. The arrest totals of 926 and 929 are close and still not identical. The woman who died weeks later is, in the official report, an allegation tied to a firebombing, not a fully narrated case. Estimates of businesses that never reopened, including the claim of more than 100, come from later historical writing rather than from the fire bureau’s $620,660. Crowd sizes at the Zone 2 station, and the words spoken in the street between neighbors and Guardsmen, live in interviews and lodge reports. They are leads, not transcripts.

There is also a dispute about names. Calling the week a riot, a rebellion, a disturbance, or an uprising is a political choice that the documents themselves do not unify. The commission said disorder, violence, burning, looting, and vandalism. The History Center said rioting. Participants in the march said they were honoring King. This chapter uses the document’s word when it is quoting the document, and otherwise describes fires, arrests, a curfew, a deployment, and a separate permitted march. That is slower than a single noun. It is also harder to misuse.

Evidence Ledger

  • Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 1968 annual report, including the April 4–12 disturbance accounting, curfew, deployment, death allegation, injuries, 505 fires, 926 arrests, and the $620,660 fire-loss estimate: pittsburghpa.gov, CHR 1968 annual report.
  • Pittsburgh Post-Gazette interactive, “The week the Hill rose up,” for the Friday-evening start near Zone 2, the Saturday spread, the Sunday march associated with Byrd Brown and Alma Speed Fox, and dated photographs: newsinteractive.post-gazette.com.
  • Senator John Heinz History Center, on April 7 as the worst reported day, a reported 189 fires, police riot gear, and the April 10 Red Vests under David W. Craig: heinzhistorycenter.org.
  • Western Pennsylvania History journal article on 1968, for the memorial march, community mediators, and Guard figures this chapter treats as reported rather than settled: journals.psu.edu.
  • Pittsburgh police memorandum, Commander William H. Moore to Director David W. Craig, April 26, 1968, evaluating the disorder from April 4 to April 12, catalogued by Historic Pittsburgh: historicpittsburgh.org.

This chapter is an original public expansion of PittsburghEverything’s Steel City Stories. It does not replace a Google Drive FULL MASTER.

Archival photographs relevant to this chapter. Sourced from Wikimedia Commons with attribution — not modern stock art.

PittsburghPaAWH2

PittsburghPaAWH2

Wikimedia Commons · PittsburghPaAWH2.jpg · HeyYallYo at English Wikipedia · Public domain

Pittsburgh - Mansion in Squirrel Hill (4678125427)

Pittsburgh - Mansion in Squirrel Hill (4678125427)

Wikimedia Commons · Pittsburgh - Mansion in Squirrel Hill (4678125427).jpg · Roger Wollstadt from Sarasota, Florida, U.S.A. · CC BY-SA 2.0

Crawford Grill, 2000-05, Lomo 8M

Crawford Grill, 2000-05, Lomo 8M

Wikimedia Commons · Crawford Grill, 2000-05, Lomo 8M.jpg · Cbaile19 · CC0

Related Stories