The Badge, The Envelope, And The Blind Corner
Preparing the first passage.
Steel City Stories · Chapter 12
The envelope is the title's question, not its proof. An envelope of cash, passed to a police officer so that a gambling house can stay open, is a fact only if a record says an envelope existed. In the Pittsburgh cases this chapter can actually read, the records say other things. They say a list of places not to be raided. They say sums of two hundred dollars. They say a meeting under the clock at Kaufmann's and a second meeting in a car near the Fort Pitt Hotel. They say a lieutenant present in a gambling room in another city, and a federal jury that acquitted him of gambling, and a civil service dismissal that did not depend on proving he had been paid. They say a 1950 petition alleging that officials took bribes to permit lotteries. They do not, in the opinions consulted, say that a Pittsburgh officer was handed an envelope. When a Pennsylvania opinion from the same era does say envelope, the city in the caption is Erie. The difference is the whole method. Protection can be inferred from testimony about money and geography. An envelope cannot be inferred from the desire to have a concrete object in the story.
What the Attorney General asked to find
At No. 59 September Sessions 1950, the Attorney General, having superseded the Allegheny County district attorney, petitioned for an investigating grand jury. Commonwealth v. Soloff, 175 Pa. Super. 423 (1954), preserves the petition's allegations because the court needed them to decide a different question. Among those allegations was this one: gambling establishments, lotteries, and houses of prostitution operated with the willful, knowing, and corrupt connivance of public officials and employees of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County, and those officials and employees accepted bribes for permitting the operations. The Superior Court later said the conclusion was inescapable that the Attorney General had sought evidence that police and public officials protected criminals for financial gain. That sentence is the court's reading of the petition's purpose. It is not a finding that the protection was proved. The opinion's actual holding threw out assault convictions of three officers because a beating during an arrest was outside the petition. The bribery clauses remained where the Attorney General had put them, in an averment.
The petition is still the right place to start, because it shows what a documented inquiry looks like before it becomes a legend. Someone in 1950 was willing to swear, in a court paper, that the problem was not a few blind corners but connivance in exchange for bribes. The grand jury that followed did not, in the reported Soloff case, return a reviewed conviction that matches that description. A reader is entitled to hold both facts. The inquiry was aimed at purchased protection. The reported appellate result was about an assault the court said the inquiry had not been empowered to charge. Between those poles, other prosecutions in the same decade tried to prove the narrower transaction: a gambler, an officer, and money.
A list, not an envelope
Commonwealth v. Parrotto, 189 Pa. Super. 415 (1959), is one of those prosecutions, and it has to be read down to the verdicts, not just to the accusation. Frank Parrotto was indicted in Allegheny County at the March session of 1958 on ten counts of bribery and ten counts of corrupt solicitation, alleged to have occurred between January 2, 1957, and January 25, 1958. At the April session, two further indictments charged bribery and corrupt solicitation on September 25 and November 28, 1956, and charged a lottery violation on January 25, 1958. The cases were tried together. The jury acquitted him on the March indictment. It found him guilty on the two April indictments. The trial court, in an opinion by Judge Weiner, arrested judgment and discharged him on the ground that the verdicts were inconsistent. This chapter has the Superior Court's recital of that history and of the testimony. It does not treat the arrest of judgment as the last word if a later line of the same opinion altered it, because the full disposition beyond the trial court's order was not the portion verified here. What can be stated is the evidence the Commonwealth put before the jury, and the split in what the jury was willing to believe.
John B. James, a Pittsburgh police officer, testified that after a telephone conversation Parrotto met him at James's flower store in Dormont on September 25, 1956, gave him two hundred dollars, said he was in the lottery business, gave him a list of places which were not to be raided, and promised two hundred dollars a month. James testified that on November 28, 1956, Parrotto again gave him two hundred dollars at the flower shop. He testified that on ten later occasions, on the streets of Pittsburgh, he was paid two hundred dollars or more. There was evidence that a number of the places on the list were in fact raided. Parrotto's defense was entrapment. He claimed he had been out of the lottery business until James contacted him on September 25, 1956, and persuaded him to go back in and to pay for protection. The jury convicted on the September and November 1956 counts and on the lottery, and acquitted on the 1957 and 1958 street payments.
No sentence in that recital says envelope. The objects are currency, a list, a flower shop in Dormont, and Pittsburgh streets. The jury's split is as important as the payments. It was willing to find the two 1956 transactions and unwilling to find the later series. That is not a picture of a machine so open that every claimed payday was believed. It is a picture of a single officer's testimony, believed in part. James is also not, on this opinion, a confessed bagman who kept the money. The Parrotto opinion as consulted here does not describe what he did with the bills. A later case, in which he is again the witness, does. The two opinions should not be averaged into one confession.
The introduction at Kaufmann's
In Commonwealth v. Ornato, James is again the Commonwealth's witness, and the Superior Court's opinion recites what the evidence supported against Albert Ornato, who was convicted of corrupt solicitation. The jury acquitted Ornato or failed to agree on the other indictments, which included bribery, conspiracy, and operating a lottery. Ornato had been arrested on August 21, 1956, and again on September 21, 1956, for operating a lottery at his residence, 1904 Fifth Avenue. James, one of the arresting officers, testified that on the way to the station after the second arrest Ornato asked if there was any way they could forget about that case, said he was all right downtown, and said there was no reason he and James could not get together. He suggested that James and Tony Grosso should get together. That evening Ornato called the flower shop and proposed the appointment. James said he met Ornato at two o'clock that night under the clock outside Kaufmann's, left his own car, and rode to the Fort Pitt Hotel. Ornato walked ahead to another car and, in James's account, came back and introduced him to Grosso.
The opinion then recites the conversation on which the protection charge depends. Grosso, with James's permission, searched him, the court says presumably for a recorder or a weapon. Grosso discussed the numbers business and said he had the downtown area, a portion of the North Side, and some of the uptown business on Fifth Avenue and Forbes Street. He offered James two hundred dollars a month to protect that area, which included the blocks where Ornato had just been raided. James agreed, took one hundred dollars, and later, at various times, additional sums totaling 2,700 dollars, which he said he delivered to his superiors along with police reports. The court held that these facts, taken together, were sufficient for a jury to convict Ornato of corrupt solicitation. The conviction affirmed in that holding is Ornato's. Grosso is a speaker in James's testimony. He is not the appellant, and this opinion is not a judgment that Grosso was convicted of bribery.
The testimony is still the closest Pittsburgh record in this chapter to the title's envelope, and it remains testimony. It includes a search for a recording device, a claimed territorial division of the numbers business, a monthly price, and an officer who says the money went up the chain with reports rather than into his pocket. If that last claim is true, James was collecting evidence. If it is false, he was a participant describing himself as a collector. The opinion uses the testimony as sufficient evidence of Ornato's guilt. It does not conduct a separate trial of James's superiors, and it does not describe the container the bills came in. A historian who writes "envelope" here is adding a prop the court did not need. The court needed the introduction, the offer, and the area. Those are enough to show how a protection arrangement was alleged to work: not as a blind corner the officer happened to miss, but as a priced geography, downtown, a piece of the North Side, Fifth and Forbes, attached to a man the officer had just arrested twice.
Presence without a payment
Baker Case, 409 Pa. 143 (1962), is the control that keeps presence from being silently upgraded into a bribe. Lieutenant Arthur Baker of the Pittsburgh police was off duty in an illegal gambling club in the Garibaldi Building in New Kensington, Westmoreland County, when federal authorities raided it on August 24, 1961. He admitted he had been there three times. He said he was looking for an errant son, not gambling, and he admitted poor judgment. A federal jury acquitted him. The city's director of public safety sent the matter to a police trial board of three superiors. The board and the department dismissed him. A lower court ordered him reinstated. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed that reinstatement and left the dismissal standing.
The court's reasons are a lesson in what an administrative record can prove. The charge, as drawn, was that Baker visited a gambling room where gambling was taking place, including at the moment of the raid, and that the visits were prejudicial to the bureau and conduct unbecoming an officer. His purpose was not an element the court thought it had to decide. The federal acquittal, even if it spoke to purpose, did not answer the charge of presence. The statute allowed discharge for just cause, not political or religious, and unbecoming conduct was an example already defined, in Zeber Appeal, as conduct that hurts morale or efficiency or tends to destroy public respect for municipal employees. Three visits by a lieutenant, the court said, condoned the operation by his presence. The justices noted they might have preferred a suspension if the choice had been theirs in the first instance. They held that dismissal was not an abuse of discretion.
Baker is therefore not a story about an envelope, and it is not a story about a proved payoff. It is a story about a blind corner of a different kind. The corner was not a Pittsburgh intersection the officer agreed to neglect. It was a room in another city's building, and the blindness was the public's, until a federal raid made a Pittsburgh lieutenant visible inside it. His explanation is in the opinion, and it is not ridiculous on its face. Fathers do look for sons in bad places. The court did not have to call him a liar to hold that a lieutenant cannot be there three times and keep the rank. The distinction matters. A city that fires an officer for being present has not proved that the officer was paid. A narrative that treats the firing as proof of an envelope has skipped the step the Supreme Court refused to skip.
Where the envelope is actually in the law
The contrast is a few counties north, and it is useful only as a contrast. In the Erie investigation reported in Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 178 Pa. Super. 434 (1955), and in the companion bribery case of Commonwealth v. Tonty, the Superior Court described an inquiry into payments to protect a numbers racket in a third-class city. Schwartz's opinion recites written statements in which money collected from numbers operators was divided, usually in the mayor's office, into three envelopes averaging five hundred dollars each. Mayor Flatley's statement, as the court recounted it, admitted receiving about five hundred dollars a month and said he suspected the money came from the numbers, while denying he took it directly from gamblers. Tonty's own case turned on payments of twenty-five dollars to vice officers, monitored calls, and bills identified by serial number. Those are Erie facts. They show what it looks like when a Pennsylvania appellate opinion is willing to print the word envelope and to tie it to a confession's description of a division of money. Pittsburgh's Parrotto and Ornato opinions, dealing with the same crime of paying police in connection with a lottery, print dollars, lists, and meetings. They do not print that word. Importing Erie's envelopes into Pittsburgh's flower shop would make a smoother chapter and a false one.
Tonty is worth naming for a second reason. It is sometimes cited as if it were a Pittsburgh protection case, because the defendant was sentenced to the Allegheny County workhouse and because monitored conversations are a satisfying kind of evidence. The opinion says the prosecution arose from an investigation by the district attorney of Erie County into bribery of Erie officials in connection with gambling. The workhouse was a place of confinement, not a statement of venue. A Pittsburgh reader can learn from Tonty how a bribery statute was applied to monthly payments that the defendant called something else. The defendant in Tonty claimed the payments were not for protection. The court said that claim was for the jury. The lesson travels. The envelope does not.
Newspaper names are not elements of the offense
A Post-Gazette historical reconstruction of a 1926 Pittsburgh Post series, and of Walter Liggett's 1930 article in Plain Talk, uses a harder vocabulary. Liggett, as that account quotes him, wrote that ward leaders, officials, and police accepted protection money and sometimes operated the houses themselves. The Post, as the same account summarizes it, pinned nicknames on officers and reported a 1928 grand jury that indicted Superintendent Walsh and lieutenants including men the paper called Faulkner and Elsner, for conspiracy to violate the Volstead Act. The account says 167 indictments were handed down, that a handful of people were convicted, and that none of the convicted were police officials or ward chairmen. The only public official convicted, it says, was a magistrate. Those sentences are about Prohibition enforcement, not about the numbers cases of 1956. They are included so the gambling chapter does not quietly absorb a liquor probe, and so a nickname is not mistaken for an element of bribery. "Red Light" and "Distillery Joe" are what a newspaper called men. An indictment is what a grand jury did. An acquittal, or a conviction that did not reach the officers, is what the Post-Gazette's historical account says happened. This chapter did not re-read the 1928 docket. It will not improve the account by deciding guilt the account says the courts did not place on the police.
The blind corner, once the envelope is refused as a prop, is a problem of discretion. An officer who has a list of places not to be raided, if James's testimony in Parrotto is true, has sold the discretion. An officer who meets a banker at two in the morning and is offered a monthly price for a set of streets, if his testimony in Ornato is true, has been asked to sell it, and says he carried the offer upstairs. An officer who sits in a gambling room in another jurisdiction, as Baker admitted he did, has spent the discretion badly enough to be fired without anyone proving a sale. A petition that alleges bribes for connivance, as the 1950 petition did, asks a grand jury to find the sale as a system. Each of those is a documented inquiry or a documented discipline case. None of them is a photograph of an envelope. The title asks the question the records keep almost answering, and then answers with money, lists, and presence instead. That is the more accurate corruption. It does not need a prop. It needs a reader willing to stop where the opinion stops.
The same officer, two juries
James is the thread, and the thread is why these cases cannot be averaged into a single department-wide confession. In Parrotto he is the officer who says he was paid in a Dormont flower shop in the fall of 1956 and on Pittsburgh streets afterward. In Ornato he is the officer who says that in the same season, after arrests at 1904 Fifth Avenue, he was introduced to Grosso and paid for a geography. A reader is entitled to notice the flower shop, the year, and the name. A reader is not entitled to decide that one testimony corroborates the other as if they were a single trial. They were different indictments. One jury believed the 1956 shop payments and rejected a later series. Another jury, in Ornato's case, convicted the man who made the introduction and did not, on the counts the opinion describes, need to convict Grosso at all. The institutional fact is narrower and stronger than a legend of universal purchase. Twice in the reported cases of that era, Pittsburgh gambling prosecutions ran through one officer's account of money. That is a documented inquiry into protection. It is also a warning that the inquiry's width is the width of a witness.
The incomplete protection is in the Commonwealth's own proof. In Parrotto, James said he was given a list of places not to be raided, and the court noted evidence that a number of those places were raided anyway. A list that is not honored is a bad receipt for a bribe, or it is evidence that the officer took the money and the bureau raided regardless, or it is evidence that the list was a sales pitch. The opinion does not choose. It puts the raids in the record beside the promise. The blind corner, on that evidence, was not a street the police had agreed to forget in fact. It was a street a defendant claimed he had bought, which other officers, or the same officer on another day, still entered. Protection that leaks is harder to romanticize than protection that works. It is also harder to disprove, because a raid can be theater and a skipped raid can be a day off. The jury's job was the payment on two dates. The historian's job is not to promote those two dates into a map of every corner in the city.
Parrotto's entrapment claim keeps the officer from being filed as a passive victim of the gambler. The defense was that James had persuaded a retired operator to return to the lottery and to pay. The jury rejected that account for the two 1956 dates by convicting, and rejected the government's account of the later dates by acquitting. Both stories were in the courtroom. An appellate reader who only quotes the two hundred dollars has chosen the prosecution's September and dropped the defense's September. This chapter quotes both because the split is the finding. Purchased blindness, if it happened on those two days, was contested, partial, and then legally unsettled by the trial court's arrest of judgment. That is a messy record. It is the record.
Baker moves the mess outside the city line, which is its own kind of corner. New Kensington is not a Pittsburgh ward. A lieutenant can be there off duty, looking for a son, as he said, or looking for a game, as the federal jury declined to find, and still embarrass the bureau that employs him. The Supreme Court treated the embarrassment as enough. It did not treat it as a window into a payment schedule. Putting Baker in the same paragraph as James's two hundred dollars would invent a continuity the opinions refuse. The continuity is professional. Pittsburgh police were found near illegal gambling in more than one posture in these years: as the alleged buyers' targets, as the witnesses who said they passed the money up, and as a lieutenant whose presence was unbecoming whether or not he had bought a chip. The envelope is absent from all three postures. The problem for the bureau is not absent. A public that cannot tell the witness from the customer from the father in the doorway cannot tell what the badge is doing on that block. The cases are how a city tells. They tell differently, and they have to be allowed to.
Soloff's three officers, discharged because an assault was outside a corruption petition, belong in the margin of this chapter and not in its center. They show a bureau that can be investigated for the wrong act and still be the bureau James worked in a few years later. The 1950 petition asked about bribes for gambling. The 1956 testimony answered with dates and dollars. The 1961 raid in New Kensington answered with a lieutenant in the room. None of the answers is the petition. All of them are what a city gets when it follows the petition into actual files. The envelope remains a picture the files do not draw. The picture they draw is an officer with a list, an officer with a report he says he filed upstairs, and a lieutenant whose presence was enough to end his job. That is the Pittsburgh record this chapter can defend. It is smaller than the title and harder to dismiss.
A blind corner can be produced by an order, by a habit, or by a price, and the cases do not let those causes share a single villain. An order would look like a command to skip a block. These opinions do not print that command. A habit would look like a lieutenant who thinks a gambling room in another town is a private errand. Baker is as close as the record comes, and the court punished the habit without finding the price. A price would look like two hundred dollars and a list. Parrotto and Ornato are as close as the record comes, and they are testimony, a split verdict, and a conviction of the man who made an introduction. The title lines the three up as if they were one object. The files keep them apart. That separation is the protection of every officer who made a raid, and it is the protection of every defendant who was not in the room. It is also the reason the purchased corner, where it can be documented, is more damning than a slogan about the whole bureau. A city can survive a lieutenant's bad night. It is in more trouble when a list of places not to be raided is a sentence a jury is asked to believe.
Evidence Ledger
- Commonwealth v. Soloff, 175 Pa. Super. 423 (1954), including the 1950 petition's bribery allegations and the limit of the investigating grand jury: https://www.cetient.com/case/commonwealth-v-soloff-2160713
- Commonwealth v. Parrotto, 189 Pa. Super. 415, 150 A.2d 396 (1959): https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/superior-court/1959/189-pa-super-415-0.html
- Commonwealth v. Ornato, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, testimony of Officer John B. James concerning Tony Grosso and Albert Ornato: https://www.ecases.us/case/pasuperct/c4938458/commonwealth-v-ornato
- Baker Case, 409 Pa. 143, 185 A.2d 521 (1962): https://www.cetient.com/case/baker-case-2194082
- Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 178 Pa. Super. 434 (1955), the Erie envelopes, used only as a contrast: https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/superior-court/1955/178-pa-super-434-0.html
- Steve Mellon, "Pittsburgh: The Dark Years," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, on the 1926 Post series and the 1928 Volstead indictments: http://newsinteractive.post-gazette.com/prohibition/
What remains disputed
James's testimony was believed in part by one jury and used as sufficient evidence in another. It is not a finding that every superior he named, or Grosso, was convicted of the payments he described. Parrotto's jury rejected the later series of street payments, and the trial court arrested judgment on inconsistency. This chapter does not resolve the appeal beyond that recital. Baker was not found to have been paid. The 1950 petition's bribery clauses were not adjudicated in Soloff. The 1928 liquor indictments, as summarized by the Post-Gazette, did not convict the police officials. Erie's envelopes are Erie's. Whether cash in the Pittsburgh cases traveled in an envelope, a pocket, or a folded list is not in the opinions read here, and it is not supplied by the title.
This is an original public expansion of Steel City Stories Chapter 12, written so the badge, the money, and the corner can be documented without treating an envelope as a fact the Pittsburgh opinions did not record.
Historic Pittsburgh · Chapter 12
Archival photographs relevant to this chapter. Sourced from Wikimedia Commons with attribution — not modern stock art.

U.S. Post Office and Courthouse, Pittsburgh
Wikimedia Commons · U.S. Post Office and Courthouse, Pittsburgh.jpg · Nyttend · Public domain

Pittsburgh police funeral cars
Wikimedia Commons · Pittsburgh police funeral cars.jpg · Brian H Rogers · CC BY-SA 2.0

Pittsburgh City-County Building
Wikimedia Commons · Pittsburgh City-County Building.jpg · PittsburghMayorsOffice · CC BY-SA 4.0
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